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Rosalind Ralph 
THE TSARIST GOVERNMENT, THE ZEMSTVOS 
AND PEASANT MIGRATION TO SIBERIA 1861 -1914 
Master of Arts 1992 
The thesis examines the development of Tsarist government policy with 
regard to the colonisation of Siberia and to peasant migration eastwards from 
the more densely populated provinces of central European Russia. 
Government policy prior to the Emancipation Act of 1861 is discussed, 
showing that under Klselev, the principle of allowing excess population from 
one area to another was accepted and acted upon. It is argued that far from 
facilitating the colonisation of Siberia, the Emancipation Act effectively halted 
its further development by restricting the mobility of the peasantry. Population 
growth, increasing impoverishment of the peasantry, demands for more land 
and government ambitions to harness Siberia's resources converged, 
resulting in growing government interest in encouraging the colonisation of 
Siberia from the mid-1880s. Peasant migration to Siberia increased rapidly 
during the 1890s under the auspices of the Siberian Railway Committee then 
fell back in the early 1900s. The Japanese attack in the Far East in 1904 
highlighted the need for swift, large-scale colonisation of Siberia and the 
upheavals and revolution of 1905 emphasized continuing peasant 
disaffection. The Stolypin reforms of 1905-1908 addressed both issues 
simultaneously, freeing the peasant from his ties and paving the way for 
heavy out-migration from European Russia to Siberia between 1906 and 
1913. After the initial peak years, by 1910, numbers of out-migrants were 
falling due in part, it is suggested, to the growing effectiveness of the Stolypin 
reforms in resolving peasant grievances in European Russia. The role of the 
zemstvo movement in relation to peasant out-migration is examined. 
Zemstvo efforts were largely in the field of welfare and practical assistance 
and directed pricipally through two regional organisations, of which the 
South-Russian Regional Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation, based in 
Poltava, was by far the more important. Its contribution and effectiveness are 
assessed. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Nineteenth century Europe was characterised by expanding industrialisation 
and the development of improved means of transport and communications. 
The populations of Europe were encouraged by these advances to become 
more mobile in search of improved opportunities, whether within their 
countries of origin of further afield. People moved from the countryside to the 
towns in search of jobs. Famines caused thousands to leave their homes and 
countries simply to survive, as in Ireland. Tsarist Russia * did not remain 
immune from these trends, despite the relative isolation of its mostly rural 
population. There was some out-migration from European Russia to Western 
Europe and the Americas, and, during the last decades of the 19th century, 
within the borders of the Russian Empire itself growing numbers of 
peasantfarmers, former serfs and state peasants alike, sought improved 
material conditions of life. Some migrated to the towns to escape relentless 
overcrowding in the countryside, others travelled far and wide within the 
Empire in search of seasonal wage-work, on both agricultural and industrial 
enterprises, to boost their livelihood, still others set off southwards and 
increasingly eastwards in search of land in less populated areas with a view 
to permanent settlement. It is with this third group in particular, those who 
uprooted their families after the Emancipation Act of 1861 in search of new 
lands to farm in the frontier regions of Siberia and the Tsarist government's 
management of their demands for resettlement, that this thesis is specifically 
concerned. 
The date 1861 is chosen as the starting point because it was the 
Emancipation Act which ostensibly freed the peasant from serfdom, thereby 
increasing his mobility and availability for migration. This is not to suggest 
that out-migration only began after 1861. 
* The writer when referring to colonisation by Russians includes within this grouping all those 
who originated from the provinces of European Russia as constituted in the 19th and 20th 
centuries up to 1917, but is well aware that Slavs other than Great Russians, and particulariy 
Little Russians or Ukrainians and Belorussians formed a considerable number among 
migrants. 
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There were several initiatives introduced by the Minister of State Domains, 
Kiselev, during the first half of the 19th century to assist the resettlement of 
state peasants from over-crowded areas to less populous regions. (1) 
Indeed, many of the bureaucratic procedures in force after 1861 were merely 
a continuation of those governing the resettlement of state peasants prior to 
that date. As such they did little to address the rural problems of the latter 
half of the 19th century. The migration movement to Siberia as it gathered 
pace was vast in scope. Between 1 8 ^ and 1916 over four million people set 
off eastwards, the majority in the years 1907 to 1910. Yet this great migration 
has evoked little attention among Western scholars. Only a handful of works 
have been published, namely those by Treadgold, (2) Coquin (3) and more 
recently Yaney (4 ). Anderson's study (5) has Its emphasis on population 
dynamics rather than legislative provision for resettlement and does not 
encompass the key years of the Stolypin agrarian reforms. Study of the 
migration movement has been mainly undertaken by contemporaneous 
Tsarist writers writing in the latter half of the 19th century and the beginning 
of the 20th century and Soviet historians. The Tsarist viewpoint however is 
firmly sited within the framework of European Russia. 
Pre-revolutionary writers study only the European Russian angle because 
there was no representative Siberian viewpoint. Modem Soviet and Western 
historians have the advantage of a longer period of historical development. 
But, there is another Issue here, namely, that while out-migration has little 
discernible effect on the areas of origin, immigration has a considerable, 
long-term and ever-growing Impact on the areas of destination. Pre-
revolutlonary historians were able to observe the migration movement In 
progress, but once it had subsided the consequences and effects of the 
movement were to be felt chiefly in Siberia. The October revolution of 1917 
meant that it was left to Soviet historians to examine and put forward Siberia's 
case. Where the pre-revolutionary writer was continuing to debate the 
causes of peasant migration, its desirability or otherwise. Its scope and the 
efficiency of its execution as a contemporary and evolving process, (6) 
modem historians are able to tackle the issue of migration in terms of both 
causes and effects. Irrevocably the emphasis has changed from analysis of 
the reasons 
for peasant migration to consideration of Its consequences for Siberia. The 
perspective shifted away from European Russia to Siberia. This process was 
already underway by the 1880s with the publication of two articles by 
Yadrintsev (7) which examined the position of new settlers in Siberia even 
before the first big waves of migrants arrived from European Russia. Among 
the most prolific of pre-revolutionary writers on peasant migration was A. A. 
Kaufman, much of whose work focuses on new settlers particularly in the 
province of Tomsk. (8) Yamzin undertakes a similar assessment in 1912. (9) 
Siberia's own centres of learning and research have produced more studies 
of the impact of peasant migration. The Soviet compilation Istoriva 
krest'vanstva Sibiri examines peasant resettlement as only one aspect of 
Siberia's development. (10) Stepynin traces the growth and development of 
Yeniseisk province as a result of peasant immigration. (11) 
For pre-revolutionary writers Siberia was a vast, virgin territory peopled by a 
small number of nomadic tribes and restrictively used as a place of exile for 
criminals and political activists. It was described as under-populated and 
under-exploited, and unrestricted immigration into Siberia was urged. (12) 
Among the priority aims of the Trans-Siberian Railway Committee were the 
populating of the empty lands along the railway with ethnic Slavs and the 
creation of new centres of productivity. (13) A. N. Kulomzin's fact-finding trip 
to Siberia In 1896 was mainly to seek out new lands for settlement. As is the 
case with all colonising nations, the advantages and gains to the coloniser, in 
this instance the Tsarist state, were the sole concern. Sifc>eria was regarded 
as a colony and its independent development sacrificed to the negative 
consequences of Russia's historical and social evolution. At the time of the 
Emancipation, unlike European Russia, Siberia had very few land-owning 
gentry and negligible numbers of serfs. (14) Old-settler communities, 
established on the basis of squatters' rights (pravo zakhvata) had evolved 
independently with little bureaucratic interference. It is argued that the 
increase In land-surveying, the result of the pressure for resettlement, was to 
the detriment of these old-settlers who often lost land they had regarded as 
theirs. Furthermore, the self-governing bodies which had been established 
within the framewori< of these communities lost their powers to more 
centralised authorities asthe resettlement movement gathered pace. (15) 
Siberia's history took a different path as a result. 
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The eastwards migration of the Russian peasantry raises four main issues. 
Firstly, the causes which provoked the population movement; secondly, the 
nature and scope of the movement, Its ebbs and flows, peaks and troughs; 
thirdly, the purpose and outcome of Tsarist government legislation associated 
with peasant resettlement; fourthly, the impact of migration on both European 
Russia and Siberia. 
There is little argument between Tsarist, Soviet, or indeed Westem historians 
as to the fundamental causes of the migration from the European Russian 
countryside. All regard rural impoverishment caused by what has been 
termed the 'crisis of agriculture' as the principle motivating factor. Analyses 
of the elements which led to the crisis are also broadly similar . The 
restrictions of mobility and on Initiative placed upon the peasantry as a result 
of the Emancipation Act meant that semi-feudal farming practices continued 
to be the norm. The difficulties in eking out a living led to increasing peasant 
Indebtedness. Added to this was the highest population growth anywhere In 
Europe during the second half of the 19th century and the increasing 
incidence of crop failures. The net result was a situation where too little 
cultivable acreage failed to sustain ever-growing numbers of people. 
Historians and social commentators of the Tsarist period acknowledged the 
reality of land-shortage and recorded the peasantry's need for more land or 
resettlement. Yanson's detailed study published in 1881 shows that many 
peasants, both former serfs and state peasants alike farmed plots well below 
the legal minimum area of five desyatinas of land per male. (16) 
Zaionchkovskii observes that land allocated to peasants within the provisions 
of the Emancipation Act was often less than that they had occupied prior to 
the Act. (17) Purchasing or renting of extra land was often out of the question 
or placed further heavy financial burden on the peasant who was still paying 
off in redemption dues what he owed on the plot of land received at the time 
of the Emancipation. Purchasing and renting of extra land was undertaken by 
the collective of the commune but not in sufficient quantities to keep pace 
with the growth In population. The attraction of Siberia's vast land resources 
to the peasants of European Russia is noted by both Tsarist and Soviet 
historians, but the point is taken further by Anderson, whose findings suggest 
that had Siberia not been available for settlement many peasants would have 
remained at their places of origin despite increasingly desperate 
circumstances. (18) Similar views are offered, 
although the case is not proven here, by Stepynin who observes that the 
migration movement was dependent upon the accessibility of Siberia's land-
mass. (19) 
Further contributing factors encouraging out-migratlon were the absence of 
internal markets for agricultural products which might have stimulated the 
introduction of more efficient farming practices and ultimately a supply and 
demand economy and the few options for wage-work to supplement a living, 
particularly in the very rural provinces of the centre and Ukraine. (20) In 
effect, there was little opportunity to develop much beyond subsistence-level 
farming. 
The Marxist-Soviet view also contends that the urge to migrate grew where 
capitalist development was least able to flourish due to the legacy of serfdom. 
(21) On the other hand, colonisation is seen to have delayed the 
development of capitalism in the over-crowded provinces of European 
Russia, but at the same time to have encouraged its grovyth in the frontier 
areas. (22) 
There is similariy little argument between Tsarist, Soviet or Western 
historians as to the scope of Russian migration eastwards into Siberia. Most 
work in this field Is predicated on official Tsarist statistics. Prior to 1885, most 
figures are either approximations and considered unreliable or are entirely 
absent. However, some zemstvos undertook their own research and were 
able to offer Insights into the development of the migration movement from 
their individual provinces. (23) More authoritative pre-revolutionaryy statistics 
are those of thenumbers of migrants which passed through the migrant 
check-points of Chelyabinsk and Syzran from 1896 until 1914. These 
continue to provide the most reliable indicators of the flows of out-migrants 
and returnees together with their licensed or unlicensed status. Similar 
details are provided for all scouts. Even these however do not provide the 
definitive numbers of out-migrants to Siberia, as those who journeyed via 
other routes were not as closely monitored. Much wori< has also been done 
to interpret the findings of the 1897 census to shed light on internal migration 
throughout the Russian Empire. Tikhonov 
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produces significant details on the flow of migrants both within European 
Russia and from Russia into Siberia based on the numbers of individuals who 
were not native to their places of residence at the time of the census. (24) 
More contentious is the role of the Tsarist government in the resettlement 
process. The special committee called in 1881 to discuss resettlement and 
the problems of rural Russia sparked off the debate. The cmcial issue was 
the extent to which out-migration should be subject to government control 
both at the point of departure and in the settlement areas. Opinion was 
divided. Yanson, while commenting favourably on the government's 
provisions to ensure an organised resettlement movement, also highlights the 
legal restrictions which obstructed the peasantry In its pursuit of improved 
opportunities. (25) Other contemporaneous commentators advocated the 
lifting of ail restriction on peasant migration to Siberia and propounded the 
view that government involvement should only take ttie form of financial 
assistance in support of migrants, reasoning that the peasantry, left to its own 
devices, would settle and exploit the land to their and the state's advantage. 
(26) By no means all intellectual opinion supported out-mlgratlon from 
European Russia. Some argued instead that a more effective, long-term 
solution to the problem of rural over-crowding would be to Increase peasant 
land-holdings in Russia. (27) An important factor in the debate is what has 
come to be known as the vested Interests of the land-owning classes. Their 
opposition to wholesale out-migration Irom European Russia was seen to rest 
on a number of issues. Firstly, they would lose revenue received from the 
peasants in the form of redemption payments, secondly, that the existing pool 
of labour would disappear, thirdly, there would be fewer opportunities to rent 
out land. (28) 
Much pre-revolutionary historical work on resettlement is seen as too 
supportive of the government and too glowing in its assessment of 
achievements. This is perhaps inevitable in volumes such as Aziatskava 
Rossiva. itself a publication of the Chief Directorate of Land Management and 
Agriculture; however, they do give an important overview of Siberia's history 
and development from earliest times, together with much geographical and 
anthropological detail. (29) 
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The attitude of Soviet historians towards Tsarist government action on 
resettlement is ambivalent. Stepynin sees two distinct periods characterising 
the government's attitude post-Emancipation towards peasant resettlement: 
the first from 1861 to 1905 when the government was cleariy opposed to 
resettlement, the second from 1906 to 1917 when the government did all in 
its power to encourage resettlement. (30) In Krest'vanstvo Sibiri three varying 
government responses are identified. The first, prevalent during the period 
between 1861 and the eariy 1880s was one of prevention, the second which 
held precedence from the 1880s until after the turn of the century was to 
allow some resettlement and finally the third, after 1904 was positively to 
encourage resettlement as a means of resolving the agrarian crisis in Russia. 
(31) This shows a slight relaxing in the Soviet hardline view of Tsarist 
government activity and an acknowledgement that legislation dduring the 
1890s, while still restrictive, went some way to easing procedures for the 
prospective migrant. However, the Soviet historian is unable to endorse 
Tsarist government legislative action during any of these periods. On the one 
hand restricting migration is seen to have been detrimental to those peasants 
from European Russia seeking resettiement, and on the other, encouraging 
massive resettlement in Siberia is considered to have left many poorer 
peasants in a state of penury as their hopes were raised and then dashed by 
the inefficiency of resettlement procedures, (32) and to have placed great 
strains on Siberia's own development. The element of force and coercion 
used to implement the government's policy of mapping out settler plots is 
highlighted. (33) 
The independent role played by some zemstvos in support of resettlement is 
given prominence by Zenchenko, (34) himself a member of the Poltava 
Zemstvo, but is more often than not ignored by Soviet historians and 
sometimes dismissed by Tsarist historians, Veselovskii for example, (35) 
although the contribution made by statisticians of individual zemstvos in 
noting numbers of out-migrants from respective provinces is generally 
acknowledged. Zenchenko stresses the distribution of information on 
settlement areas and the guidance offered to migrants at the point of 
settlement as being significant contributions, but this last has received the 
Soviet charge of propaganda in support of resettlement. (36) Sidel'nikov 
notes the cooperation between the land settlement commissions and the 
zemstvos in the distribution of funds for migrants. (37) 
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zemstvos in-tt^-distPibutlGn-Qf-fynds-fot^migrants^ST) 
The fourth issue raised by migration of the peasantry to Siberia Is the Impact 
the movement had on the supplying provinces of Russia and the receiving 
territory of Siberia. The effect on rural Russia of peasant out-migration was 
minimal in comparison with that on Siberia of a massive influx of population. 
The European Russian perspective viewed resettlement not in isolation, but 
as a component part in addressing the problems of land shortage and rural 
destitution before the turn of the 20th century and even prior to the 1861 
Emancipation Act in the days of KIselev's Initiatives on resettlement. After 
1905 a positive resettlement policy emerged but still remained as only one 
aspect of the overall package of land and agricultural reforms undertaken by 
Stolypin. For Siberia, Russian peasant immigration was one of, if not the 
most Important single development in its modern evolutionary history. The 
movement irrevocably determined the nature of Siberia today, its settled 
areas, its demographic mix, the level of its industrial and agricultural 
development, the exploitation of its natural resources. It Is generally 
acknowledged that Siberia rapidly became agriculturally very productive. It is 
also generally accepted among Tsarist and Western historians that the 
peasant who settled successfully in Siberia enjoyed a higher standard of 
living than had been his lot In European Russia. (38) Sklyarov however, 
vigorously questions the conclusion that on the whole migrants benefited 
materially from resettlement and re-examines the methodology employed, 
maintaining instead that the new settlers' apparent prosperity depended 
largely on their level of affluence prior to leaving European Russia and that 
therefore resettlement did not necessarily assist the poor peasant. (39) 
Further examination of the peasant's economic level of well-being in Siberia 
is however beyond the scope of this thesis which will study resettlement and 
the migration movement from the perspective of European Russia. While the 
one-sided nature of this approach is acknowledged it is the attitude and 
legislation of government and zemstvo response, dictated by the exigencies 
of the agrarian crisis within European Russia which forms the basis of this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
PEASANT MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT PRIOR TO 
THE EMANCIPATION ACT OF 19TH FEBRUARY 1861 
The spontaneous movement eastwards by the peasantry of European Russia 
during the 19th and the early 20th centuries marks a watershed in the history 
of the colonisation of Siberia. Before examining the migration movement of 
the European Russian peasantry after the Emancipation Act of 1861, it is 
intended in this chapter to outline briefly the extent to which Siberia was 
colonised in the preceding centuries and to examine what, if any, specifically 
peasant migration, or resettlement, had taken place and government policy 
towards it. 
The first farming communities in Siberia were set up in 1590 when the 
Russian state launched attempts to establish permanent, civilian centres of 
population by transferring peasants to cultivate the land and provide food for 
the conquering, military garrisons. Initially volunteers were sought, but if 
Insufficient numbers came forward, suitable quotas from given areas were 
press-ganged into giving their services. These early colonisers were settled 
on land near the garrisons and issued with seed. Once their crops were 
established they were required to hand over up to one-fifth of their produce to 
the local authorities. (1) 
*(The Russian word 'pereselenie' has been translated variously in this thesis 
as migration, resettlement or relocation. The term migration has been used 
when referring to the spontaneous, popular phenomenon of movement of 
peoples. Resettlement and relocation have been used to emphasize the 
movement of peoples assisted by outside agencies subject to specific 
administrative procedures). 
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By the 1640s Russian explorers and military expeditions had reached the 
Pacific at the Sea of Okhotsk. A settlement was established at Okhotsk in 
1647. In order to consolidate territorial gains the pattern of settlement 
outlined above continued: territory was conquered, a garrison built and 
farming communities established. By the 17th century, a system was already 
in operation to encourage persons to move to Siberia with the promise of 
sustenance en route and the provision of certain financial aid and material 
supplies on arrival at their destinations. In return for these benefits, such 
persons were expected to assist in the erection of government buildings and 
in general to set up a basic infrastructure, providing roads and transport and 
busying themselves with agricultural and forestry work. (2) 
By the end of the 17th century, 25,000 Russian households were established 
in Siberia, nearly half peasant families situated primarily in Western Siberia. 
(3) An indication of the intended permanency of early settlement in Western 
Siberia is given in the fact that the towns of Tyumen and Tobolsk were not 
only founded in 1586 and 1587 respectively, but were also awarded the 
status of towns in those same years. (4) 
It was during the 17th century that steps were taken to bring to an end the 
peregrinations of the peasantry who, it seemed, were continually on the move 
in search of more fruitful lands. In order to stabilise this fluctuating workforce, 
millions of peasants vk'ere settled on plots of land, for which they were 
required to pay a rent either in money or in produce to the owner, either the 
state or a landlord. (5) G.T. Robinson writes of the resulting gradual decline 
towards serfdom, as peasant indebtedness increased over the centuries, 
binding peasant families ever more closely in subservience to the landlord. 
(6) 
Up until this time the peasantry had moved around at will and some had 
crossed the Urals into Siberia without let or hindrance by the state. The 
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peasant's new settled status however, restricted this freedom of movement 
and made such action contrary to law. An Imperial deaee of 24th June 
1683, addressed to the military governor of Siberia, made it apparent that 
Siberia was not open to free settlement, by stipulating that any Russian 
crossing into Siberia should be forcibly detained. (7) The Imperial state was 
to be the sole arbiter for determining the colonisation of Siberia. 
Nevertheless, Siberia was seen as a haven for the fugitives who fled across 
the Urals despite all prohibitions. They were often Old Believers, who faced 
persecution, frequently in the form of the death penalty, in the Russian 
homeland, or peasants who had absconded from their plots of land, 
dissatisfied with their lot. Many originated from northern and north-eastern 
Russia where the schismatic movement had enjoyed particular support. The 
relative proximity of these areas to Siberia and the availability of river routes 
enabled the fugitive to flee and the absconder to disappear more easily. (8) 
In 1719 two deaees concerning Siberia were issued, the first on 29 May 
acknowledged the territory's developing importance and the necessity for 
imperial control by dividing Siberia into three regions or provinces, the 
second of 4 December allowed for the despatch of peasants to Siberia with 
their prior agreement. A clause no doubt open to interpretation. (10) The 
government was powerless to stem the movement of these fugitives and a 
decree was passed on 11th June 1763 legitimising the position of those who 
had fled to Siberia and whose travel permits had expired. (9) This acceptance 
of the fait accompli was to be repeated several times in the following century 
as the lesser of two evils when coping with illegal settlers, the alternative 
being forcible repatriation. It was also recognised that it was to the state's 
advantage to encourage successful civilian settlement in order to retain its 
territorial acquisitions. Also contained within the decree was approval for the 
recruitment of merchants for settlement in Siberia. 
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other settlers during the 17th century included prisoners-of-war, the results of 
Russian expansion westwards at the expense of Poland and Lithuania, exiled 
political and religious dissidents, administrative personnel, fur-hunters, 
traders and peasant farmers and artisans. (11) The situation changed little 
during the 18th century. Coquin refers to several organised attempts to 
populate certain areas during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762 -1796): 
in 1763 several groups of Old Believers were exiled to the Altai region; in 
1783, several hundred volunteers were despatched to settle the route from 
Yakutsk to Okhotsk; In 1795 settlers were sent to the area around the upper 
Irtysh river, but the total number of colonisers resulting from these measures 
amounted to no more than three to four thousand. (12) Nevertheless centres 
of population were springing up: Tomsk was founded in 1604, Yakutsk in 
1632 and Irkutsk in 1651. (13) The famous 'trakt' was already in existence in 
the time of the Empress Elisabeth (1741 - 1761 ), meandering from Russia 
proper as far as Irkutsk and beyond. (14) 
By 1797, the number of Russian settlers in Siberia was in the region of 
575,800 persons (15) and already greatly exceeded the total indigenous 
populafion whose number was put at only 363,362. (16) 
Two years later an ambitious project was initiated by the decrees of 17th 
October 1799. It marked a first attempt by the Russian state at substantial 
colonisation of Siberia, in this case of the Transbaikal region near the border 
with China. The decree ordered the transfer within one year of some 10,000 
volunteer male peasants, made up of retired soldiers, miscreants sentenced 
to exile and serfs released by their masters specifically to become colonists, 
to the area bordered by Lake Baikal, the upper Angara, Nerchinsk and 
Kyakhta. Each adult male transferred under the scheme was to receive thirty 
desyatinas of the most fertile, culfivable land available in the area. (17) 
The voluntary nature of the scheme is stressed in Aziatskava Rossiva and all 
the advantages and support which were to have been provided, including 
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houses, are highlighted, but no assessment of the succesor failure level is 
given beyond a brief statement that the difficulties to be overcome on the 
journey alone were in the extreme. (18) Coquin concludes that the problems 
involved in organising the transfer of 10,000 families to Far Eastern Siberia 
and supervising their settlement proved well-nigh insurmountable. He 
emphasizes the non-feasibility of the project from the beginning, not only in 
terms of the lack of preparation to receive the new colonisers, but also in the 
absence of the necessary administrative back-up to ensure that all were able 
to complete the journey. By 1806, although some had been installed in the 
designated area, a majority had set up temporary homes along the journey 
route. (19) 
As the wealth of Siberian natural resources came to be recognised, so the 
desire to exploit these created the need for a permanent labour force. While 
some exiles worked out their sentences of hard labour in Siberia, their 
numbers were not sufficient to meet the perceived requirements. In order to 
increase the number of labourers the decree of 17 October 1760 had allowed 
for the despatch to the factories of Nerchinsk of criminals of both sexes who 
had been sentenced to exile. Further legislation enacted on 13th December 
1760, granted land-owners the right to volunteer their unwanted serfs for 
resettlement in Siberia by the administrative authorities. (20) Alan Wood 
details the workings of this law and subsequent related decrees which 
specified the age limit and fitness level of serfs which would be accepted 
under this scheme. He argues that while the government viewed the 
measures primarily as a means of increasing settlement and the workforce in 
Siberia, the reality of the transfer of these serfs was as harsh and punitive as 
that of other exiles. (21) 
Coquin notes that following the enactment of the 1799 law several villages in 
the Caucasus petitioned for the right to be transferred to Siberia. (22) Fearing 
possible depopulation and consequent vulnerability of their newly acquired 
territories of New Russia,th authorities introduced punitive measures on 17 
June 1812 to restrict movement out of the area. The law forbad peasants to 
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move from one province to another. It also revived the provisions of a law 
requiring peasants remaining in a village to pay a tax on those who left to 
settle elsewhere. On the other hand the law also held out a carrot to 
peasants and Cossacks settling in New Russia in the form of a special 
allowance. (23) Clearly, peasant mobility was to be held strictly within the 
state's control and resettlement directed to where lay the state's priority for 
colonisation. 
The problem of rural overcrowding within the central provinces of European 
Russia was highlighted as early as 1810 by the Governor of Tambov, who 
alerted the government to the problems faced by the provinces of Ryazan, 
Tambov and Orel. Where earlier in the provinces there had been land in 
plenty, many villages now had no more than two or three desyatinas of land 
per male soul. (24) This led inevitably to increasing impoverishment and 
indebtedness of state peasants caused by the inability to produce enough 
yield on the amount of land available to them. 
Little was done to address these ills until 1822 when proposals put fonvard by 
the then Governor General of Siberia, Speransky, were made law. 
Speransky recognising that the population of Siberia needed to be increased 
if he sNas to fulfil his task of consolidating the temtory, wished to encourage 
peasant settlement in Siberia and proposed that Siberia be opened to 
settlement by state peasants. The law of 10 April 1822 provided for such 
resettlement for those with less than five desyatinas of land and further 
stipulated that permits to settle be authorised on demand, not only to those 
wishing to move from European Russia to Siberia, but also from one province 
to another within Siberia. There were, however, several conditions to be 
fulfilled prior to being granted a permit, namely the despatch of a scout to 
reconnoitre suitable land for settlement, the acquiring of a certificate of 
permission to leave the commune of origin and a certificate of acceptance 
from the commune at the point of destinafion. Furthermore, all debts had to 
be paid off in full. (25) As in 1812, the fear that New Russia would be left 
insufficiently populated as state peasants rushed to take advantage of the 
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relaxation in laws governing their mobility led the state to except the New 
Russia provinces of Kherson, Tauride and Ekaterinoslav from application of 
the 1822 Act by a new decree of 26 January 1823. (26) 
The issue of shortage of land received increasing attention. A commission 
set up in 1826 estimated that up to 900,000 state peasants had less than the 
legal norm of eight desyatinas per male soul. (27) The act of 1822 entitled 
the state peasant with less than five desyatinas of land to apply for 
resettlement in a less populous area. The earlier ban on resettlement in 
Siberia had been removed. (28) Yet, few availed themselves of the 
opportunity to resettle in Siberia. Between 1826 and 1834, legal migrants 
arriving in Omsk oblast numbered only 4,487. (29) The number of fugitives, 
or illegal migrants, was not much greater. In 1826, 1,102 adult males were 
found to be illegally settled in Tomsk province, but only half of these were 
primary immigrants, originating from European Russia; the remainder had 
moved from the neighbouring Siberian province of Tobolsk. (30) 
By 1837 the government was sufficiently concerned about the problem of 
rural over-crowding to create two new bodies specifically to address the 
question of peasant resettlement. The first was the Sibirskoe Mezhevanie, 
or Siberian Survey, introduced by law of 7 March 1838 and tasked with 
locating and surveying lands suitable for settlement. (31) The second was the 
Ministry of State Domains, founded on 26 December 1837. The 
establishment of the new ministry was one of a series of proposals put 
forward by Count Kiselev as a part of a reorganisation of the rural 
administration. The new Ministry was to be responsible for overseeing and 
promoting the well-being of rural areas and agriculture, by means of 
resettlement where necessary in cases of land shortage. (32) As such, its 
responsibilities included the administration of all peasants occupying state 
land, but not of the serfs who were seen as the concern of their individual 
owners. 
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Under the direction of the Minister, Count Kiselev, the Ministry, in its first 
years, conducted extensive research into the size of peasant land-holdings 
throughout forty-three provinces. It found that only in seven provinces was 
the legal norm of eight desyatinas of land available per male soul. Thirty 
provinces did not have enough land to provide even the minimum specified 
land-holding of five desyatinas per male soul. Thirteen provinces could only 
provide between one and three desyatinas per male soul. (33) As a result of 
its findings, the Ministry became increasingly concerned with organising a 
strategy and ultimately, procedures for encouraging a redistribution of excess 
population. 
With the principle of mobility of state peasants established, since 10 April 
1822, the way lay clear to reducing overcrowding in those areas most 
seriously affected by means of the transfer of surplus population to regions 
where land was in plenfiful supply. Thus declared the law of 8 April 1843 on 
resettlement. (34) The government was clear in its own mind of the 
objectives, but what of the method of their achievement ? In order to 
encourage a sometimes still reluctant peasantry, the 1843 law introduced 
incenfives for peasants to move out of crowded areas. In settlement areas 
hereditary family plots would be created. A determined procedure for 
resettlement was agreed; that migrants would depart in groups accompanied 
by a guide and were required to be supplied with provisions for the journey. 
Migrants would be eligible for certain benefits namely bread for consumptiori, 
seed, 100 trees per family for construction of abode and a grant of twenty 
roubles per family, thirty-five roubles in non-wooded areas. Each family 
would additionally be given one pair of oxen, agricultural implements and 
crop seeds. Migrants would also enjoy exemption from taxes for up to six 
years and would not be eligible for conscription or the billeting of soldiers for 
an initial three years. (35) Migrants should hail from the most densely 
populated provinces and should be channelled towards areas which the 
government considered to be in need of settlement. Migration, better termed 
in this instance resettlement, at this stage, cleariy very much was government 
inifiated and directed. 
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Between 1838 and 1845, some 61,464 peasants were officially transferred to 
other areas under the auspices of the Ministry of State Domains, the majority 
of whom settled in Ekaterinoslav, the Caucasus, Orenburg and Saratov. (36) 
As yet Siberia remained too remote for the peasant who had the option of 
resettling somewhere less distant. Nevertheless, the government continued 
to encourage peasant migrants to Siberia. The law of 14 March 1839 
reiterated that state peasants would be allowed to settle in Siberia and made 
Siberia the only destination open to those wishing to relocate from areas with 
sufficient land to grant each peasant the legal norm. (37) Disastrous 
harvests in the years 1841 to 1845 and the resulting famine conditions 
encouraged many peasants to petition for transfer to other areas. The 
Ministry of State Domains seized the opportunity and applicants were 
directed towards Siberia. Coquin notes a memorandum from Kiselev to his 
subordinates instructing them to direct migrants towards Kurgan in Tobolsk 
province and to liaise with the governor to see how many migrants might be 
accommodated and even to suggest to applicants who had expressed a wish 
to settle somewhere other then Siberia that they should head for Kurgan 
instead. (38) In all, some 100,000 migrants made their way to Siberia during 
the years 1845 and 1855. (39) The law of 17 June 1847 stressing the 
desirability of increasing the Russian peasant population in Siberia in ratio to 
the indigenous peoples and exiles advised the continuing support for 
Siberia's economy and specifically its agriculture. Between 1852 and 1862, 
the Ministry of State Domains resettled some 14,000 men and women from 
the north and north-eastern provinces of European Russia who had been 
invited to volunteer for relocation in Yenisei and Irkutsk. (40) 
Hand in hand with its policy of resettling peasants from overcrowded areas 
the Ministry was releasing more state land for occupation by state peasants 
and sometimes reducing the size of larger plots of land in an attempt to 
increase the size of the smallest allotments. By 1857, benefits available for 
peasants applying for resettlement, in addition to those outlined above, 
included the provision of a fresh water supply and mills for the processing of 
crops. (41) 
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The procedure for embarking on government-sponsored resettlement, 
however, was lengthy in the extreme. The would-be migrant had first to 
submit three documents to the okrug authorities: a request to migrate, a no-
objection certificate to his departure from his commune and an endorsement 
from the volost authorities that there was no legal impediment to his 
relocation. These documents would then be passed to the local office of 
State Domain which would in turn forward them to the Ministry of State 
Domains. Here it was, more often than not, the minister himself v ^ o 
approved the applications, on the basis of several criteria, but chiefly that the 
applicant was presently domiciled in an area of land shortage and that 
conditions in the intended area of destination, such as climate, were not too 
different from those in the province of origin. Once registered for 
resettlement the peasant might still change his mind and remain on his home 
plot, but once embarked on the journey to his settler plot, he was committed 
and forfeited all rights to return to his place of origin. (42) 
Once permission to relocate had been received, the would-be migrant was 
entitled to despatch a scout to examine the allocated settler plot and to 
choose an alternative plot if the first was not suitable. Measures were 
relaxed for those moving to Siberia in that they might despatch a scout before 
pemnissioh to resettle had been received, requiring only a letter of release 
from the commune and confirmation from Siberia that they had chosen a 
location in which to settle. (43) Further aid to migrants included the provision 
of food and medical assistance on their journey and the issuing of itineraries 
detailing the routes and distances to settlement areas, even determining the 
mileage to be covered each day. Provincial authorities were to be informed 
of the exact date of the migrant's Scheduled arrival in their respective 
provinces. Any loss of numbers before leaving each province had to be 
accounted for, discouraging defectors en route. (44) These were 
advantageous provisions by any standards, but their efficacy was reduced by 
bureaucratic delay. Applications to relocate were taking longer and longer to 
process, frustrating the desires and needs of the peasantry. Many left 
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without waiting for official sanction, creating the confusion and chaos the 
Ministry had hoped to avoid, as they settled on unprepared land without 
benefit of government assistance. (45) 
Siberia was still far from being the preferred destination of migrants despite 
government incentives. Of some 170,000 requests to be relocated received 
by the Ministry by 1844, little more than one thousand were applications to 
resettle in Siberia. 
Movement of peoples is rarely easily controlled and despite the government's 
efforts to direct and channel migrants, there were those peasants who chose 
to ignore all restraints and relocate without benefit of government assistance. 
Their reasons for doing so were varied, but for those arriving from the 
overcrowded central provinces of European Russia bureaucratic delay or 
rejection of their application were often the chief cause. There was, too, 
much movement of the peasantry within Siberia. Often peasants who had 
undertaken resettlement under the auspices of the Ministry of State Domains, 
quickly farmed their lands to exhaustion or found that that their lands were 
unproductive, and felt fully entitled to move on at will. This became such a 
problem, hampering the work of the surveyors, among others, that a law was 
introduced in January 1846 once again prohibiting the movement without 
authorisation of the peasantry within Siberia. Peasants from provinces 
bordering on Siberia, from Orenburg particulariy, also settled illegally in 
Siberia, feeling they had been squeezed out by the influx of settlers from the 
central provinces. (46) 
By the tenth revision of 1858, the total population of Siberia, excluding central 
Asia, had reached almost three million, of which over two and a quarter 
million people were either Russians or foreigners and the remainder native 
Siberians. The 1797 census had revealed a figure of some 575,756 non-
indigenous residents in Siberia. (47) The population growth during the 
intervening sixty years was attributable to a number of factors, among them 
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the rate of natural increase, the continuing policy of exiling political dissidents 
and criminals, and to fugitive peasants attracted by the wealth of unoccupied 
land and the opportunities for work in the gold-mining districts of the Altai in 
Tomsk province. There was only a negligible number of government-
sponsored peasant settlers. It is estimated that of some 350,000 peasants of 
both sexes resettled t)etween the later 1830's and the mid 1860's under the 
aegis of the Ministry of State Domains, little more than one third, or 115,000, 
were moved to Siberia, mainly to the western provinces of Tobolsk and 
Tomsk. (48) 
By 1851 some 300,000 persons were registered in Siberia as peasants. (49) 
By 1858, of registered peasants only a handful, 3,701 were serfs (50) and 
with perhaps fewer than 100,000 state peasants settled in Siberia under 
Kiselev's policy of resettlement by 1858, the great majority of peasant settlers 
in Siberia prior to the Emancipation were old-settlers, (starozhily) and 
descendants of past fugitives. A few freed proprietary serfs may have made 
their way to Siberia following the law of 1844 which freed a landlord from 
paying poll-tax or other duties on an ex-serf and may occasionally have given 
some small encouragement to voluntarily release a serf. (51) 
Recognition within governing circles of the problems of rural overcrowding in 
European Russia was matched by acceptance of the desirability, indeed 
necessity, of population redistribution. The resettlement work of the Ministry 
of State Domains was primarily targeted towards channelling settlers to New 
Russia, but the procedures for resettlement, laid down by the Ministry, 
established the principle of government-aided resettlement and, as such, 
became the basis for the development of resettlement activity in Siberia later 
in the century. Already some migrants were being directed towards Siberia 
and government legislation appeared to be making conscious efforts to 
encourage out-migration to Siberia from the more densely populated areas. 
Thus far, only the interests of the state peasant were being considered. For 
these peasants, resettlement might have proceeded smoothly, growing in 
scope and developing more efficient practices had it not been for the 
intervention of the Emancipation Act of 1861. The Act, which bound the 
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former serf to his plot of land, later similariy restricted the state peasant, 
imposing new restraints on the mobility he had previously enjoyed. Rather 
than continuing Kiselev's policy of encouraging population redistribution 
through resettlement, the Emancipation Act effectively put an end to it, 
although the problems which had prompted Kiselev's reforms remained. 
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GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PEASANT MIGRATION AND 
RESETTLEMENT 1861-1914 
There is agreement that the Emancipation Act of 19 February 1861 did little 
to benefit the cause of peasant resettlement. In the view of D.W. Treadgold, 
the A c t " removed the legal bar to migration along with personal servitude ", 
but did not reduce the practical difficulties which faced the peasant who 
wished to leave both his land and commune. (1) f.M. Watters saw the Act as 
confirming the primacy of the group, in this case the village commune, o r ' 
obshchestvo', over the individual. Where the peasant had been tied to the 
landlord he was now tied to the commune. (2) Aziatskava Rossiva. under the 
editorship of G.V. Glinka, considered that the Act, while declaring othenft-ise, 
continued to deny the former serfs the right to freedom of movement. (3) 
Skylarov agrees, stating that the act withheld from the peasant any right to 
seek freedom of movement. (4) In effect, the Act ignored the question of 
resettlement. The conditions for release from the commune were such that to 
fulfil them was almost impossible. (5) As Yanson concludes, it is intended 
here to examine those provisions which might have affected the freedom of 
movement of the individual peasant and therefore his availability for legal 
migration. 
The Emancipation Act was concerned with abolishing the system of serfdom. 
Its objectives, therefore, were to free the proprietary serf from his lord. The 
landlord would no longer own the serf. In general terms the Act provided for 
an allotment of agricultural land for each fonner proprietary male serf and a 
house and garden plot assigned in heredity. The former serfs were to be 
organised into village communes, 'obshchestvo' and administered by a village 
assembly,' sel'skli skhod'. The Act continued to recognise the two traditional 
fomns of land-tenure, the repartitional and the hereditary. 
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The former serf was required to accept his allotted plot of land and to 
purchase, or redeem it financially over a period of time from his former lord. 
He did not have the right to refuse his land allotment. The 
redemption dues were calculated separately for each locality. In Chernigov 
they ranged from 1 rouble 40 kopecks to 2 roubles 50 kopecks per 
desyatina, in Poltava from 2 roubles to 2 roubles 50 kopecks per desyatina 
and in Kharkov from 1 rouble 80 kopecks to 2 roubles 80 kopecks per 
desyatina. (6) Often redemption dues were charged upon land valuations, 
above the market value, ( i n order to adequately compensate the landowner 
for his loss ). The high redemption charges, and the lack of financial 
resources among the peasantry invariably dictated that redemption was 
undertaken with financial assistance from the government. In the case of 
communes with repartitional tenure of land, once this aid had been accepted, 
all households in the commune became communally responsible for the 
redemption payments. Henceforth a householder might renounce or transfer 
his allotment only with the consent of the village assembly. Should the 
emancipated serf wish to withdraw from the commune altogether, he was 
required to pay off half the debt still owed upon his allotment and surrender 
the land to the commune but, there was no compulsion on the part of the 
commune to guarantee the balance of the debt, a condition that also had to 
be met. If however a householder, acting as an individual, redeemed his 
house and garden plot, he was permitted to renounce the remainder of his 
allotted land, provided that the land which he retained was no less than one 
third of the maximum plot allocation. Such a course of action, however, 
would leave the emancipated serf with little possibility of making a living other 
than through wagework as a farm labourer, which offered little security or he 
might sell up and move out to either another district or to the town. 
In the communes with hereditary household tenure, provided he acted before 
the establishment of the redemption process, the individual householder 
could leave the commune if he surrendered ail claim to his allotment. 
Further, if the commune's households decided to redeem their plots and the 
redemption process was already underway, the individual householder might 
only transfer his allotment to another member of the commune who was 
willing to assume his redemption payments. If however, the householders 
decided to act together in the matter of redemption payments, the commune 
was required to convert the allotments into repartitional communal holdings 
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with the application of the appropriate provisions. Furthermore, if a commune 
redeeming its land collectively agreed to the departure of more than one-third 
of its members without receiving any replacement members, no additional 
member would be allowed to leave without meeting his redemption payments 
in full. The Emancipated serfs, therefore, were tied to the commune until the 
completion of these redemption payments on their plot of land, or for a 
maximum period of forty-nine years. 
Additional restrictions on the movement of heads of households included the 
requirement to ensure that neither he nor any member of his family had any 
debt, that his redemption payments were paid until the following 1st January, 
that any incapacitated family members who were to remain in the commune 
were provided for and finally, that he was in receipt of a letter of acceptance 
from the commune in which he proposed to settle. The plot of land which he 
proposed to occupy had to be of a size not less than that stipulated for the 
area and situated not more than 15 versts from his new commune. Certain 
other conditions had to be met by any member of the commune before he 
might legally depart, whether temporarily or permanently, including the 
requirement to be in possession of a passport. For the first two years, or until 
the village communes had been established, these were still issued by the 
landlord. Subsequently, elected representatives of the peasants assumed 
the responsibility and the corresponding right to deny passport applications 
for whatever reason. A non-head of a household also needed the consent of 
his father before he might leave the commune permanently. 
As may be seen, far from offering incentives to peasants to move, the Act 
positively discouraged any thoughts of leaving the commune legally. Those 
who might have been inclined to leave were precisely those peasants with 
the least opportunity to do so legally, that is the less successful members of 
the commune. House-servants and peasants attached to factories or mines 
were given the opportunity to move from their home district inasmuch as they 
were permitted to join a commune of their choice, but these too were tied to a 
plot of land while making redemption payments. (7) 
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As the shortfalls of the bill became more apparent, provisions had to be 
relaxed for other categories who were then able to relocate, such as those 
hired labourers to whom the landlord did not agree to grant a plot of land, 
provided they found themselves in this position as of 1st January 1865. 
Later, a decree of 1868 allowed smallholders of the western provinces to 
move to free state lands. (8) 
In effect there was little immediate change in the circumstances of the former 
serfs. It was a different matter for the state peasants. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, the state peasants had been administered by the Ministry 
of State Domains where the principle of resettlement in cases of land-
shortage had been accepted and acted upon as early as the 1830s and 
1840s. The law of 18 January 1866 transferred the administration of these 
peasants to the Ministry of the Interior. They were assimilated with the fomier 
serfs and subject to the same regulations introduced by the Emancipation 
Statute. (9) Not only had they lost the possibility of relocating, but they now 
found themselves tied to the land for an indefinite period. (10) 
Together with the abandonment of the resettlement policy of Kiselev and the 
Ministry of State Domains, the hitherto substantial assistance, both en route 
and at their destination, which had been offered to those state peasants who 
wished to move was halted by the law of 15 December 1866. (11) 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1860s the government continued to seek 
volunteers for its policy of strategic settlement within Siberia. Barely a month 
after the promulgation of the Emancipation Act, volunteers were being sought 
to settle the Amur district. Other attempts were made to recruit settlers in 
1865 for the mining district of the Altai in Western Siberia. In 1866 the South-
Ussuri region was opened to settlement and in 1868 for Semireche. Only 
state peasants were eligible to apply. They were obliged to register with old-
settler communes where they were allocated up to fifteen desyatinas of land, 
for annual cost of 6 roubles, but after 1866 were not entitled to any loans or 
benefits. (12) 
These two objectives of colonising Siberia and continuing to reduce the 
pressure of over-crowding in the countryside of European Russia might have 
36 
continued to develop together, but the new restrictive measures imposed on 
former serfs and state peasants alike by the Emancipation, demonstrated a 
lack of awareness of the situation in rural areas. The result was an 
incoherent policy and general unpreparedness for the peasantry's push out of 
European Russia towards the end of the century. 
Perhaps in acknowledgment of some of the contradictions present within its 
existing policy, the government in 1869, called a special Commission of the 
Ministries of the Interior, State Domains and Finance to examine the existing 
legal framework for resettlement and to make recommendations in the light of 
the increasing demand for the right to relocate. The Commission found that 
the new restrictions imposed on the fomrier state peasants were incompatible 
with the government's recognition of the necessity to populate certain areas, 
and did little to serve the interests of either the treasury or the peasantry. It 
argued that, rather than restricting the movement of fomier serfs, the 
government should have extended the right to settle on free state lands, 
previously enjoyed by the state peasants, to the former serfs. The 
Commission recognised that there were peasants who had settled on land 
illegally and recommended that these should be allowed to remain in situ, 
but, in order to limit future such occurrences it proposed the opening of 
provincial offices dealing with the peasants' affairs which would be better able 
to monitor whether or not all legal conditions had been met by a prospective 
migrant. These offices would also pass on information received from the 
Ministry of State Domains on the location of free lands for settlement and 
direct migrants accordingly. The commission further recommended that the 
subsidies to migrants which had been abolished in 1866 should be restored 
and that additional assistance, including agricultural advice, should be 
offered to new arrivals to encourage successful settlement. (13) While these 
recommendations appear reasonable enough they were never ratified by 
government. 
Yanson argues strongly that the government's indecisiveness was a major 
weakness in its policy-making. He illustrates his assertion by reference to two 
circulars issued in 1868. The circular of 13th April 1868 stressed the 
importance for legal migration of obtaining the necessary permits. Firstly, the 
peasant needed proof that he had registered with and been accepted into an 
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old-settler commune at the point of destination. This had to be shown to the 
authorities at his place of origin together with a release letter from his ' volost 
'. Both permits were subsequently submitted to the local office of the Ministry 
of State Domains at the intended settlement area on amval. To the peasant, 
Yanson suggests, the law signified government sanction of resettlement. The 
second circular of 4th May 1868 denied the peasant the right to sell-up before 
he had received permission to leave the commune. (14) This was a 
government attempt to limit the numbers of peasants who might be tempted to 
leave and settle elsewhere illegally with no provision, the reasoning being 
that they would not simply abandon their homes and possessions and set off 
with nothing. Not only was the requirement often unforceable, but it may also 
have had the opposite effect, in that obtaining permits often required money, 
usually realised by selling homes and personal effects. If the peasant lacked 
the wherewithal to obtain the necessary permits, he had no alternative but to 
leave illegally if he was determined to leave at all. Furthermore, rather than 
spend money on permits, he would have more means for the journey and 
settlement elsewhere. 
The government viewed the checks on peasant enthusiasm to leave as 
necessary. Land ready for settlement was not sufficient and local authorities 
were not prepared for the welfare difficulties to which an influx of hungry, 
often destitute, peasants would give rise. Yet, peasants were neglecting to 
sow their land, were selling up and leaving, often with no provisions for the 
journey, ostensibly in anticipation of receiving permission to relocate. Others 
simply left regardless. Many of them were so-called ' darstvenniki', * (cf. pp 
45 & 78 ) those who had opted to forfeit their plot of land rather than accept 
forty-nine years of redemption payments. (15) If indeed government intention 
was to limit numbers of illegal and destitute peasants with its second circular 
of 4th May 1868, then it miscalculated the determination or desperation of the 
peasant migrants. 
Illegal or unlicensed migrants were to form a considerable proportion, 
frequently a majority throughout the period of resettlement, up to 1916. 
* See also pp. 45 and 78 
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The powerlessness of the government to control illegal settlement is 
illustrated by its acceptance of the fait accompli. The government recognised 
that there was little benefit to be gained by repatriating illegal settlers, rather 
the contrary, such action would give rise to greater administrative difficulties 
and hardship. Accordingly, the laws of 9th April 1869 and 6th February 1871 
regularised the position of some categories of illegal migrants in Orenburg 
and Ufa provinces. Some migrants, volunteers, who had left their villages 
with the intention of reaching the Amur district and who had agreed to 
undertake the journey at their own expense, were often destitute by the time 
they reached Orenburg and unable, either physically or financially, to 
continue their journey. They remained illegally in Orenburg. The government 
now agreed to allow them to settle in Orenburg, granting them plots of 
treasury land here in lieu of those awaiting them in Siberia. Similarly, others 
who had travelled to Orenburg on passports rather than with permits to 
relocate and had remained, while still retaining their plot of land in their home 
provinces, were now obliged to surrender these and re-register at their new 
place of domicile. The laws applied to between 10,000 and 15,000 peasants. 
(16) 
The law of 9th April 1869 also relaxed slightly the measures imposed on the 
peasant v ^ o wished to leave his commune by waiving the stipulation that he 
needed to pay off half his redemption dues before departure provided that, by 
leaving, the peasant did not contribute to an increase above the upper plot 
limit of plot size for the remaining peasants. (17) In other words, the easing 
of this particular restriction did not apply in areas where land was in sufficient 
supply. 
In 1873 the Ministry of the Interior called a further special Commission to 
examine the problems of resettlement in Orenburg province and ease the 
burden of the illegal settlers. The Commission concluded that treasury lands 
should be made available for settlement by those in the province who had 
remained without land after April 1869, whether they had left their communes 
with permission to relocate or without. It also recommended that migrants 
should be assisted in acquiring the ownership of land they were renting on 
condition that they contributed part of the purchase price. The Commission 
further advised that resettling peasants in Siberia should be discontinued in 
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view of the large numbers of migrants who failed to complete their journey 
and remained in Orenburg. (18) Government attempts to colonise strategic 
areas of Siberia continued to meet with little success, attributable chiefly to a 
lack of government assistance in terms of transport and financial subsidy and 
to the peasant's own inclination to first colonise the more easily accessible 
areas. 
The Commission targeted its new proposals for regularising the position of 
illegal settlers towards those who fonmed the bulk of illegal settlement, that is 
those without land. The primary consideration was the need to restrict the 
growth of a floating and therefore potentially unstable population. The 1873 
Commission's recommendations finally came to fruition in the law of 28th 
January 1876 which made settlement on free treasury lands in Orenburg and 
Ufa provinces a legal entitlement for landless peasants and those who had 
received the minimum size plot of one-quarter of a desyatina, the so-called ' 
darstvenniki ', (cf pp. 43 and 78 ). They were not pennitted to refuse their 
allotted plots. Peasants who had left their communes legally were also 
entitled to settle on free treasury lands. (19) Pemriits to migrate would be 
granted subject to fulfilment of the following conditions: that the would-be 
migrant had no outstanding debts, that his taxes, including his redemption 
dues, were fully paid up unfil 1st January of the following year, that he was 
not liable for military service and that he was in possession of an acceptance 
certificate from his proposed new commune. (20) 
Again in 1881 as part of the temporary regulations, proposed but never 
published, of 10th July 1881 the position of yet more illegal settlers was 
regularised. (21) Widespread illegal settlement was now occurring further 
east in Siberia itself in the Altai region of Tomsk province, where the number 
of non-registered settlers was estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 males in 1876. By 
1882, this number had risen to 18,000 and to more than 30,000 only eighteen 
months later. (22) 
See also pp. 43 and 78 
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The whole question of resettlement was being debated in the Russian press 
of the 1870s. It was argued that all restrictions on the free movement of the 
peasantry should be lifted, that containment was the root cause of the 
overcrowding which existed in the rural areas where, instead of peasants 
having the freedom to settle areas in proportion to the local labour 
requirements, they continued to be tied to a plot of land of insufficient size, 
which could only become smaller as it was further sub-divided, were saddled 
with an enormous debt in the form of redemption payments and were 
generally prevented from taking any initiative which might enable them to fulfil 
their potential as small agriculturalists. (23) The government was accused of 
not understanding the historical imperative of the migration movement, of 
refusing to acknowledge the natural laws which dictate that fertile 
unpopulated land should be settled and rendered productive and, further, that 
it misconstrued the desire of the peasant to improve his economic situation 
by settling in less congested areas, as a tendency to rootlessness and 
therefore as a character weakness of the peasantry. (24) In 1881 several 
proposals were put to a special Commission under the temporary legislations 
of 10th July 1881, Vfemennye pravila o pereselenii krest'yan na svobodnye 
kazennye zemli. These included recommendations that the criteria for 
eligibility to migrate should be widened, applications to relocate from anyone 
in straitened circumstances should now be considered and any debt arrears 
should be transferred to the new place of domicile rather than requiring to be 
paid off in full before departure. They also proposed that migrants should 
receive between eight and fifteen desyatinas of land. However, the proposals 
were never ratified and were subsequently abandoned. (25) One positive 
result was the establishment in Batraki of the first migrant office assessing 
the number of out-migrants from the Russian provinces and providing 
information on free land plots. (26) 
The government felt itself under considerable pressure to act on the question 
of migration, but considered that it had little room for manoeuvre. It feared 
that to lift restrictions on the free movement of the peasantry would plunge 
the country into chaos with, possibly, irreparable damage to an already 
inefficient economy. Furthermore, the lifting of restrictions would have 
entailed the repeal of the Emancipation Act with far-reaching implications for 
the whole structure of rural society, including the peasant's relationship to the 
land and to the landlord. This was not something the government was 
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prepared to contemplate. Not only might the vested interests of the 
landowners, presently safeguarded by the provision of the Act, have been 
jeopardised as they lost their workforce, but a massive undirected dispersal 
of population might have resulted. The unpreparedness of individual 
migrants, who often had little idea where they were headed, how long their 
journeys would take, or how they would take, or how they would set up a 
homestead and feed themselves in the meantime, was matched by the 
unpreparedness of the government, which had insufficient administrative 
systems in place to respond to the consequences of a mass movement of 
people. The resulting chaos might have amounted to a massive human 
catastrophe. Maintaining restrictions was the only option. 
In the mid-1880s the direction of the migration turned increasingly eastwards, 
following declarations by the territories of New Russia, Tauride, 
Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, the Caucasus, especially the area around Stavropol 
and Samara that they had no more state land available for occupation. In 
1890 the government officially suspended all granting of land to migrants in 
Samara province. In the following years the ban was extended to Saratov, 
Orenburg, and Ufa. (27) The closing down of New Russia as a destination 
for migrants meant that the government could now promote Siberia as an 
attractive alternative. New measures of 17th May 1884 marked a significant 
development in this direction. The measures declared that more land was to 
t>e made available in Siberia and divided into migrant plots and that 
additional migration offices to assist migrants were to be opened on the 
principal migration routes to Siberia, especially in Tobolsk and Tomsk. (28) 
As a consequence, in January 1885, a special team of surveyors was 
created, based in Western Siberia, (Zapadno-Sibirskii pereselencheskii 
otryad), (29) similar to the Sibirskoe Mezhevanie of Kiselev's day, and further 
migration offices were opened in Orenburg, Ufa, Ekaterinburg, Tyumen, 
Tomsk and Barnaul. One of their primary functions was to monitor the flow of 
migrants, but they also issued itineraries, agricultural advice, medical 
assistance, fanning implements and infonnation on vacant lands. (30) This 
last was particularly important. Of those peasants relocated in Ufa province 
during the 1870s little more than one-third were actually settled on land which 
belonged to them or the commune. The situation was worse in Orenburg 
where the number fell to less than 10%. (31) This insecurity created a large 
and potentially intinerant group who were likely to move, or be moved on, 
exacerbating the situation for initial migrants and officialdom alike. 
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Between 1885 and 1892 the West Siberian survey team mapped out 146 
resettlement regions, an area of some 430,000 desyatinas, mainly in Tomsk 
province. On the basis of 15 desyatinas per adult male, this should have 
been enough to accommodate some 28,500 adult male migrants, although 
Krest'vanstvo Sibiri v epokhu kapitalizma puts the figure at 48,000 male 
migrants. In reality, 25,680 were able to settle, the remaining land being 
unsuitable. (32) Over the seven year period land was prepared for an 
average of little more than 4,000 adult male migrants a year. The average 
number of arrivals per year during the period is put at 32,519, but this figure 
includes both sexes. (33) Even allowing for the inclusion in this figure of 
children and taking an average of five dependants per adult male, land to 
accommodate neariy 5,500 adult male migrants annually would have been 
needed. Land surveyed and prepared fell short of what was now required. 
The survey teams were not keeping pace with the out-flow of migrants. 
Particulariy significant amongst the 17th May 1884 measures was the 
provision at clause 7 for a new section within the Ministry of the Interior, 
dealing specifically with resettlement. (34) It is unclear to what extent this 
new department was to t>e responsible for formulating resettlement policy. Its 
activities did however include the issuing of permits to migrate. The 'land 
section', as it was known, later evolved into the Resettlement Administration 
when this organisation was formed in 1896 with Krivoshein as its deputy-
director. Krivoshein had previously served in the 'land section'. (35) 
While acknowledging the growing impetus to migrate and recognising the 
necessity to prepare, the government was still reluctant to allocate the 
necessary resources. Government expenditure on resettlement in the late 
1880s was low and to become lower. The Plehve Commission of 1885 
envisaged an annual budget of 200,000 roubles for the purposes of 
resettlement. Although this sum was in addition to the annual budgetary 
allowances for the migrant offices and surveying teams, at an estimated cost 
of something less than 300 roubles for successful resettlement of a family, it 
was only enough to resettle between 2,000 and 3,000 families a year. Total 
government expenditure on resettlement amounted to something 
considerably less than half a million roubles per year. Following the 
measures of July 1889, (dealt with in greater detail below), the 200,000 
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roubles migrant assistance was reduced to 120,000 roubles annually. (36) 
Greater emphasis was to be placed on the financial resources of the 
prospective migrant in assessing his suitability for resettlement. Coquin 
notes a decree of 1st June 1882 which made available ' considerable 
resources ' for the settlement of the Russian Far East by sea via Suez and 
Singapore. (37) This was a continuation of the government's strategic 
settlement programme. As such it may have been viewed as a separate 
issue from the spontaneous overiand migration and presumably would have 
been separately financed. 
To what extent the 13th July 1889 law on resettlement was a product of the 
new ' land section' is arguable. Certainly there was some consultation 
between interested parties prior to the final draft of the law. The special 
commission of 1881 analysed the options for the organisation of 
resettlement. Proposals ranged from granting universal freedom to migrants 
with government assistance to those most in need to only permitting those 
peasants with less than 1/3 of the legal average plot-size to resettle. (38) 
There was also consultation between government and provincial governors 
on the need or othen^vise for resettlement. (39) The law itself marked an 
attempt to clearly define the parameters for legal migration. In Krest'yanstvo 
Sibiri it is considered that the law brought resettlement under strict 
government control. (40) Sklyarov maintains that the law preserved the spirit 
of serfdom in the field of resettlement and goes on to argue that, indeed much 
pre-Stolypin legislation on resettlement was enacted from the standpoint that 
serfdom was still in existence. (41) Yaney also concludes that the law stifled 
any peasant initiative requiring him only to obtain the necessary papers. (42) 
Under the new law, permits to relocate had to be obtained from both the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Domains. Applications to 
migrate were to be submitted to the provincial governor, who would forward 
the application to the Ministry of the Interior together with details of the 
peasant resources and recommendations from the local official in charge of 
peasant affairs, also known as the land captain. The Ministry of State 
Domains would choose a suitable settlement plot for the migrant on the basis 
of soil fertility and agricultural conditions. Land would be issued on the basis 
of the actual number of male souls. To those resettling In European Russia, 
land would be issued for rent on a temporary basis for an initial period of 
between six and twelve years, after which settlers would be awarded 
permanent tenure. In Tomsk, Tobolsk and the steppe regions of Semireche, 
Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk, land would be issued immediately in 
permanent tenure. The decision on whether to farni the land communally or 
individually was to be left to the new settlers. The establishment of new 
settler villages was permitted provided they comprised no less than forty 
males. New villages were either to join existing Volosts or set up new ones. 
The land vacated by the out-going migrant was to revert to the commune 
together with responsibility for maintaining redemption payments. (43) Legal 
migration would entitle the peasant to two years exemption from tax and 
military service, for those settling in European Russia, plus another two years 
at half-rate tax. Exemption from tax and military service would be extended to 
three years if the peasant was settling in Tomsk, Tobolsk or steppe lands. 
What the law failed to advertise, and Coquin highlights, were the benefits 
which might be issued, in cases of need, to the migrant by the authorities. 
These included assistance in the form of free building materials, the 
provision of grain and agricultural implements. (44) The procedures for legal 
migration remained ponderous, and were cleariy unable to cope with the 
volume of migrants which flowed eastwards following the harvest failures and 
resulting famine of 1891. Meanwhile the chaos caused by growing numbers 
of applications to migrate and thousands of illegal, and ill-prepared migrants 
moving in the same direction was compounded by the shortage of migrant 
plots available for settlement in Siberia. (46) The situation was such that a 
Ministry of the Interior circular of 6th March 1892 halted the issue of permits 
to migrate altogether. (47) 
It was little wonder therefore that the 1890s saw a significant rise in the 
percentage of unlicensed migrants, the so-called ' samovol'nye '. The 
peasants became less and less willing to run the gauntlet of bureauaatic 
procedures when their very lives were at stake. They cut their losses and 
headed eastwards with or without authorisation. According to Yamzin, the 
rise in the number o f samovol'nye ' began in 1896 when 38.7% of the total 
number of migrants left their home provinces without permits. (48) Yaney, 
more credibly, points to a sharp increase in illegal migration between 1891 
and 1894 with the number of illegals passing through Chelyabinsk in 1894 
reaching 78% (49). Figures for this period are not available here, but similar 
high percentage levels of illegal migrants are evident in 1904 and 1905 when 
the government also halted the issue of permits and again in 1908 (see Table 
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I ). While the total number of migrants was significantly reduced in these 
later instances, inevitably the percentage of unlicensed migrants rose 
dramatically. Government policy was able to stem the flow of out-migrants 
but not stop it altogether. 
Simultaneously with the new laws on resettlement, a new functionary was 
introduced into rural areas. The ' zemskii nachal'nik ', or land captain, was 
instituted by the statutes of 12th July and 29th December 1889. (50) These 
Land Captains were local, government appointed officials who would submit 
their own recommendations in support of a peasant's application to migrate. 
They are widely viewed in a less than positive light as another level of 
government control in the countryside. The fact that these land captains 
were recruited exclusively from the local hereditary nobility, had to own an 
estate within the province and have some level of education may have raised 
peasant suspicions which were in no way allayed by the land captain's power 
to impose fines of up to six roubles or a maximum of three days 
imprisonment. Yet, they may also have been used in a more favourable 
capacity as conduits between the Ministry of the Interior and the countryside, 
disseminating and executing at a local level government policy with regard to 
rural issues. Similariy, they were in a position to make recommendations 
and representations to the Ministry from a local standpoint. Yaney proposes 
that the land captains played an important role in the government's attempts 
to control the migration movement. It was they, he suggests, who quickly 
identified to the land section of the Ministry of the Interior the need for 
financial assistance for migrants. Yaney further speculates that failure to 
elicit appropriate funds for this purpose may have led land captains to 
encourage illegal migration thus contributing to the rise in numbers of ' 
samovol 'nye ' between 1891 and 1894. (51) Linking the ' zemskiienachal'niki 
' with the new measures on resettlement may be supported by their 
introduction on consecutive days. 
The founding of the Siberian Railway Committee by the two decrees of 10th 
December 1892 and 15th January 1893 (52) confirms the thrust eastwards 
towards consolidation of Siberia. The Committee became the government's 
instrument for the realisation of this ambition. Development of the railway 
and the subsequent utilisation of Siberia's resources formed a key element in 
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Sergei Witte's push for industrial and economic expansion. In 1892 Witte 
moved from his post as the Minister of Communications to become the 
Minister of Finance. The natural home for the Siberian Railway Committee 
would have been within the Ministry of Communications, but it was placed 
with the Ministry of Finance, directly under Witte and therefore had powerful 
support in its endeavours, although nominally, the law of 15th January 1893 
had placed the management of the Committee in the hands of the Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers. The Committee's primary task was to oversee the 
development of the railway, but from the beginning its area of activity was 
much wider, encompassing responsibility for the management and 
organisation of the whole resettlement process in Siberia. (53) Its objective 
was to spread Russian influence by the introduction of ethnic Russians 
throughout areas traversed by the railway, stimulating the growth" of new 
centres of Russian population and promoting new economic opportunities 
while neutralising any unsympathetic attitudes on the part of the indigenous 
people. (54) This ambition for an ethnically integrated Siberia dominated by 
Russians is further illustrated by a clause in section li of the law of 15th April 
1896 which stressed the desirability of integrating as far as possible the 
indigenous population within communities of Russian settlers. (55) 
It was the Siberian Railway Committee which doubled the numbers of 
surveyors, (56) opened up new lands for settlement, earmarking some three 
and a half million desyatinas of suitable free land between 1893 and 1897, 
which prepared migrant plots trying to ensure that each had the requisite 
arable land, wood, drinking water, which planned the infrastructure, building 
churches and schools, roads, postal offices, which ensured water supplies 
were available, which organised the transport of migrants to their chosen 
destinations, providing food and medical assistance at points along the route. 
The Committee also issued loans of neariy two million roubles to migrants in 
1896, studied the impact of Russian settlers on nomadic indigenous 
populations and undertook expeditions to establish the amount and location 
of land suitable for settlement in Siberia. (57) 
The Siberian Railway Committee was also closely concerned with initiating 
legislation on the migration question. The worrying and overwhelming 
number of illegal migrants after 1891 led to the setting up in 1895 of a special 
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Commission, under the auspices of the Committee, to investigate the failure 
of the existing laws to deal adequately with the many applications to migrate. 
The Commission concluded that the high incidence of illegal migration was 
due to such short-comings as the \ong delay between the application to 
migrate and the final issuing of the permit and the few benefits to be gained 
by migrating legally. (58) The law of 15th April 1896 went some way towards 
addressing these short-comings by simplifying procedures for legal migration 
and offering publicised benefits to legal migrants. (59) Permits to migrate 
would now be needed only from the Minister of the Interior who might 
delegate this responsibility to the official in charge of peasant affairs at 
provincial level, in other words, the land captain. Once in receipt of a 
resettlement permit, the migrant would be entitled to rail transport at special 
reduced rates as far as possible to his chosen settlement area. There was a 
further easing of government control : where hitherto the Ministry of State 
Domains had allocated land plots, now the peasant, subject to agreement by 
the land captain, might send a scout to reconnoitre a suitable plot within the 
settlement area and register a claim which would remain valid for a period of 
two years. These scouts would also be entitled to a return journey by rail at a 
reduced rate. The law also adopted a more pragmatic approach to illegal 
migration. The illegal migrant, while continuing to be ineligible for any 
benefits such as exemption from tax and military service, would be permitted 
to settle on Treasury lands and be legally registered provided that he was not 
wanted by the law and that provision was made for family members remaining 
in his old place of residence. Any debts or tax arrears accrued at the 
migrant's old place of residence would no longer fall to his commune for 
payment but would be transfen^ed to his new domicile to be paid off within ten 
years. A further circular of 20th January 1897 made the despatch of a scout 
obligatory. (60) Responsibility for the dissemination of information regarding 
the frue conditions to be encountered during resettlement was to rest with the 
Ministry of the Interior. (61) 
Meanwhile the Ministry of the Interior through the land section was urging the 
land captains to give every assistance to those wishing to migrate legally. 
Provincial authorities were advised to deal more quickly with applications to 
migrate. (62) Over the next few months, in 1896, a mass of legislation was 
introduced, proposed by the Siberian Railway Committee, to regularise the 
position of illegal settlers in the Altai and settle them on proper plots. The law 
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of 27th April 1896 (63) was directed towards legalising the position of illegal 
migrants in the Altai. Migrants who had joined communes of industrial 
workers without the necessary permits should now be legally registered and 
allotted a plot of land of up to fifteen desyatinas, subject to availability. 
Migrants who expressed desire to settle in specific areas should be permitted 
to do so with appropriate registration and on plots of up to fifteen desyatinas. 
Such settlers would be exempt from poll tax for three years from the date of 
their registration and liable to only half-tax for the following three years. 
Similarly, settlers who did not fall in the above categories should register in 
the volosts or towns in which they were living whereupon they would benefit 
from tax exemption. The provisions were subject to verification of the identity 
of the settlers and conditional upon their not being wanted by the law. May 
23, 1896 saw the introduction of a law relating to plot-size of land allocations 
to peasants and indigenous people on Treasury lands in Tobolsk, Tomsk, 
Yenisei and Irkutsk. (64) A maximum plot-size of fifteen desyatinas was also 
established in these regions. Communes and villages might petition for an 
increase in the amount of land occupied if this was less than fifteen 
desyatinas per plot. On the other hand, if an area above fifteen desyatinas 
per male soul was occupied by a village or commune, the excess might only 
be retained with the provision that additional settlers would be accepted so 
that occupation was reduced to fifteen desyatinas. A further law, designed to 
help restrict illegal migration within Siberia was introduced on 12th April 
1897. Any settler who moved after he had been issued with a plot of land in 
Siberia would not be entitled to settle legally on another plot and his allocated 
plot would be considered free for occupation by other migrants after a period 
of three years. (65) 
It was soon realised, however, that while the government was encouraging 
the process of obtaining authorisation to become shorter and less 
bureaucratic, the amount of land ready to receive migrants was quickly 
disappearing. As before, surveying and the preparation of new lands could 
not keep pace with demand. The law of 15th April 1896 even gave the 
Siberian Railway Committee the right to demand free labour from village 
residents to assist its survey teams in Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and 
Semirechensk. (66) In 1897 land reserves were sufficient to accommodate 
some 129,000 individuals. (67) Although the number of out-migrants in 1897 
was relatively low, (67,653 ), numbers for both 1896, (177,168) and 1898 
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(146,002) exceeded that for which land was available (Table I refers). 
Attempts were again made to reduce the numbers of migrants. Confidential 
government circulars were sent to local officials and the land captains urging 
them to make known the shortage of available land and to discourage 
applications to migrate. (68) Restrictions on the issuing of permits to resettle 
were reintroduced by the newly operational Resettlement Administration 
(Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie ). The Resettlement Administration was 
established on 2nd December 1896 as a department of the Ministry of the 
Interior with its own budget of 51,900 roubles per annum. It succeeded the 
old land section of the Ministry and retained the land section's employees. 
The function of the new department was to direct the issuing of permits to 
settle, to organise the movement of migrants, to look after new settlers, to 
disburse all credits for settlement and to work out new legislation and 
administrative measures for the future development of resettlement. (69) 
Acknowledging the chaotic state of the migration movement, the limited 
number of plots available and other contributing causes to unsuccessful 
settlement, the new Resettlement Administration declared that it would be 
necessary to become more selective in issuing permits to migrate. Arefev 
refers to Kulomzin's trip to Siberia in 1896 and his finding that where, 
hitherto, migrant plots had included land which had seen earlier cultivation, 
migrants now were having to clear virgin land before they could think about 
planting crops. This required much greater physical strength and expense on 
the part of the migrant. Kulomzin recommended that only those families with 
enough strong, able-bodied members and sufficient funds to see them 
through the initial difficult period should be allowed to migrate. Further 
circulars were issued forbidding the despatch of scouts until the would-be 
migrant family had received its permit to migrate. Resettlement would not be 
pemnitted unless the migrant's home commune would benefit from a lowering 
of its numbers and provided the family was neither too small, nor too poor to 
resettle successfully. All attempts at illegal migration were to be nipped in the 
bud. (70) 
Together, the Siberian Railway Committee and the Resettlement 
Administration made considerable improvements to the conditions which had 
obtained earlier. The introduction of scouting assisted in reducing the 
50 
number of persons wandering aimlessly in Siberia; the mopping-up operation 
of allocating migrant plots to those illegally settled in the Altai helped to 
clarify the position with regard to vacant land; the limit placed on the amount 
of land held firstly by new settlers and subsequently by old-settlers, ' 
starozhily ', to a fifteen desyatina maximum, plus three of forest, made more 
land available for migrant plots. In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri. this is seen as a 
negative development, subject to frequent abuse in that land was often 
appropriated from old-settlers where their occupation was less than fifteen 
desyatinas per adult male, and therefore detrimental to the interests of the 
peasants. (71) The irrigation projects, the communications links of roads, 
telegraph stations, the social and cultural amenities such as churches, 
schools, medical centres, all assisted in the establishment of more settled 
communities, while the loans, cheap rail-fares and wayside medical and food 
provisions enabled migrants to reach their destinations more easily. (72) 
During these twelve years between 1893 and 1905, expenditure on all 
aspects of resettlement reached some thirty million roubles. This included 
8,467,175 roubles on land allotment, or 705,594 roubles annually. (73) The 
1896 legislation on resettlement signalled the government's commitment, 
albeit reluctant, to the principle of resettlement and its recognition that 
government should assist both materially and legislatively towards its 
successful completion. No longer was the emphasis to be upon restriction 
and containment. Instead the settlement process was to be restructured and 
organised on a more ordered and realistic footing, and peasant initiative 
acknowledged and to some extent supported. With the extension of the 
Siberian Railway into Siberia, the wishes and needs of the peasantry for 
more land and the interests of the Russian state in colonising and expanding 
into vacant, untapped territory were once again able to complement each 
other as they had in Kiselev's day. 
The Siberian Railway Committee and the Resettlement Administration wori<ed 
together as separate bodies until a reorganisation of government 
departments in 1905 when the two were merged to form a single body, the 
new Resettlement Administration. Initially located within the Ministry of the 
Interior, the new Resettlement Administration was transferred on 6th May 
1905 to the newly-combined Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains v^ich 
was in turn renamed the Chief Directorate for Land Management and 
Agriculture (Glavnoe upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliya ). Within the 
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same law was provision for the foundation of a Committee for Land Affairs to 
deal with general policy direction of all land and resettlement questions and 
to examine the activities of the landowner's Land Bank and the Peasant Land 
Bank. (74) The new Resettlement Administration became responsible for all 
aspects of resettlement including land surveying, preparation of migrant plots, 
plot allocation and overseeing the improvements of farming practices 
amongst settlers. (75) 
This rationalisation preceded the drastic overhaul which was being prepared 
for Russian agriculture with the Stolypin refonns and marked the importance 
with which resettlement was now viewed within the context of Russian 
agriculture and agricultural reform. The possibility should not be dismissed 
that the creation of the new department was in preparation for coping with the 
very great increase in numbers of out-migrants which the government 
foresaw as a result of its prospective agricultural reforms. Prior to this 
government reorganisation, responsibility for managing peasant resettlement 
had been distributed amongst the Ministries of the Interior, Finance and 
Agriculture and State Domains. The first Resettlement Administration, set up 
in 1896, had been created from the land department operating within the 
Ministry of the Interior. The Trans-Siberian Railway Committee lay with the 
Ministry of Finance, under the personal supervision of the Minister, Sergei 
Witte, while the Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains had dealt with 
Land-surveying. (76) 
The emergence of the new Resettlement Administration led to a more co-
ordinated approach. Siberia was divided into twelve areas for the purposes 
of resettlement. A manager was appointed in each area to oversee the 
preparation of land and settlement of migrants. Each of the twelve areas was 
in turn divided into sub-regions, each again with its own resettlement official 
who, additionally, supervised the provision for and development of education, 
health, communications, subsidies and general economic well-being of the 
new settlers. (77) 
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This fairly dramatic change of attitude on the government's part towards 
peasant resettlement was prompted by various factors. The poor harvests of 
1899, 1900 and 1901 caused widespread misery, even famine conditions in 
some parts of European Russia. Riots erupted amongst the peasantry in 
1902. These were particularly serious in the provinces of Poltava and 
Kharkov, where a total of eighty estates were sacked by peasants in search 
of food, fifty six in Poltava province and twenty-four in Kharkov. (78) Shortage 
of land was a continuing grievance. In 1902, the special conference on the 
needs of agriculture recommended the formation of local committees at 
gubernia and uezd level to assess the requirements of agriculture. Many 
called for increased loans to the peasantry by the Peasant Land Bank and 
significantly, for the resettlement of peasants short of land on Cabinet lands. 
The zemstvo agrarian programme of 1905 demanded that resettlement 
should be established on a wide basis. (79) These recommendations, 
demands, observations, disturbances coalesced in the government's 
collective mind and produced rapid and dramatic changes in peasant law in 
the form of Stolypin's land-reforms which redefined the peasant's status and 
his potential. 
Numbers of migrants fell by nearly half between 1900 and 1901 and dropped 
by more than half again in 1904 and 1905 as a consequence of the Russo-
Japanese war. What migration there was in 1904 and 1905 was almost 
entirely without authorization and reflects the government's reluctance to 
issue any permits to resettle during this period. (Table I shows the high 
percentage values for unlicensed migrants in 1904 and 1905 ). Migrant 
transport was severely curtailed with the need for trains to convey troops and 
armaments to the Far-East. 
With depressed numbers of out-migrants during 1904 and 1905, pressure in 
the more over-crowded central provinces was again building up and the 
continuing peasant unrest, particularly towards the end of 1905, encouraged 
the government to take swift action to eliminate one long-standing peasant 
grievance. On 3rd November 1905 the government committed itself to 
reducing redemption payments by half in 1906 and abandoning them 
altogether by 1907. (80) In 1906 further measures were introduced to 
address rural over-aowding. The issue was to be tackled on two fronts : 
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firstly, by extending peasant land-holdings within the provinces of European 
Russia. Henceforth, the Peasant Land Bank would be allowed to lend the 
total purchase price for land at a reduced rate of 4.5% interest. Secondly, 
families from severely over-crowded areas would be resettled in less 
populated regions. To this end the Committee for Land Settlement Affairs 
was established within the Chief Directorate of Land Management and 
Agriculture, on 4th March 1906, with land-settlement commissions at both 
provincial and uezd levels answerable to it. The provincial and uezd land 
settlement commissions each included six elected representatives forming 
roughly half the membership, three from the zemstvo assemblies and three 
from the peasant volost assemblies. The role of the commissions was to 
assist the Peasant Bank in purchasing suitable land and advising where 
sales of land were most needed to increase peasant land-holdings and 
generally facilitate the purchase of land by the peasant. (81) The uezd land-
settlement commissions, particulariy, also enabled the government to further 
decentralise resettlement procedure. Henceforth all petitions for resettlement 
were to be directed to them. It was left to the uezd land-settlement 
commissions to decide who should receive priority to migrate, based on a 
number of criteria : firstly, that there was no other way of increasing a 
peasant's land-holdings; secondly, that family resources were sufficient for 
the journey and initial period of settlement; thirdly, that agriculture was the 
chief means of livelihood. Parties of scouts in receipt of government loans 
were to be organised by the uezd land-settlement commissions and the land 
captains. It was further recommended that the uezd land-settlement 
commissions be given the authority to issue scouting and travel pennits and 
reduced rate train passes. (82) They became responsible for organising 
legal resettlement at a local level. 
Towards the end of 1906 two more important pieces of legalisation were 
introduced. On 5th October 1906 the peasant's mobility rights were extended 
to equal those of other citizens. No longer would the peasant be required to 
obtain a certificate of discharge from the commune or be automatically 
expelled from his commune of origin if he joined another. Furthermore the 
peasant would be able to choose his place of permanent residence. This 
was of particular relevance to peasants contemplating the move east-wards 
into Siberia and must have contributed in some measure to the surge in 
numbers of out-migrants from European Russia from 1907. Other provisions 
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within the bill included the abolition of the land captain's powers to impose 
fines without due procedure of law. (83) The following month on 9th 
November 1906 Stolypin's law confirmed the individual peasant's right to 
ownership of private property. The peasant might now demand the 
consolidation of his land plot and if this was not practicable he would be 
entitled to monetary compensation from the commune. (84) The reforms 
constituted a major offensive on the agricultural front. They sought not only 
to re-structure a system of land-holding which had been in operation for 
hundreds of years, but also to redefine the status of the peasant. He was to 
become a landowner rather than a tenant, an individual farmer with his own 
decisions to make rather than a member of the commune dependent upon 
and answerable to the collective. It was hoped that the peasant, acting on his 
own initiative and for his own advantage, would introduce improved farming 
practices. 
The reforms also benefitted the would-be migrant, providing him with a 
saleable asset. In the event of a sale, usually to the Peasant Land Bank, the 
proceeds would accrue to him, furnishing him with much needed funds to 
finance both the journey to Siberia and the initial settling-in period, thus 
making successful settlement a more likely outcome. The government's 
interest was served by the resulting growth in the amount of land available to 
those peasants who remained. The alacrity with which prospective out-
migrants took advantage of their right to sell their plots is well demonstrated 
by Tyukavkin who found that while, between 1893 and 1903 only 38.9% of 
out-migrants sold their plots before departure, between 1904 and 1910 70% 
of out-migrants sold their plots. (85) 
The reforms produced an explosion of out-migrants in 1906 and particularly 
in 1907 and 1908. 1907 was the golden year for out-migrants with record 
numbers leaving European Russia with full government encouragement, 
evidenced by the low levels of unlicensed out-migrants and scouts, (see 
Table I) despite an enormous rise in actual numbers. 
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The government's volte-face with regard to resettlement, from restriction to 
encouragement and its full acceptance of resettlement as a necessary tool, 
amongst an array of other measures, to improve the agrarian situation is also 
illustrated by the considerably more than doubling of government expenditure 
on peasant resettlement between 1906 and 1907. Japan's aggression in the 
Far East had also highlighted the need for the very rapid colonisation of 
Siberia. There was also considerable pressure for the quick resolution of the 
problems of land-shortage. Vociferous demands had been made in the First 
Duma for not only state, cabinet and church lands to be made available for 
settlement by the peasantry, but that privately owned land should be forcibly 
expropriated and handed over to the peasantry. The government resisted 
firmly, pointing out that there were also private landowners among the 
peasantry, and strongly defended the principle of inalienability and 
inviolability of property. The disagreement led to the dissolution of the first 
Duma on 9th July 1906 only 72 days after its opening. However, the 
message was clear; the peasantry would not wait forever to seize the land 
they needed. (86) In 1906 expenditure on resettlement amounted to a total of 
5,317,269 roubles of which more than half was allocated to the preparation of 
migrant plots (see Table II). 1,580,945 roubles was set aside for subsidies, 
working out at almost exactly 66 roubles per migrant family for the 23,693 
families which set off for Siberia in 1906. This accorded with the average 
subsidy per family allowed for by the government. (87) More than three-
quarters of a million roubles was to be spent on the provision of medical and 
food aid. The remainder, less than 200,000 roubles, supported the 
Resettlement Administration. Expenditure in 1907 rose to a total of 
13,528,933 roubles with the greatest increase in funds being allocated for the 
migrant subsidies, up from one and a half million to 7,037,189 roubles. On 
the same basis of 66 roubles per family, this was a considerable overestimate 
and allowed for the resettlement of over 106,000 families. In fact only 63,753 
families (421,335 individuals) moved to Siberia in 1907, but by now the 
government was clearly anxious that as much land as possible be added to 
the land pool in European Russia by out-migration. Spending on the 
preparation of migrant plots increased by a further 2 million roubles and the 
amount allocatted for food and medical provision doubled. Administrative 
expenses were reduced to 106,048 roubles. 
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The Chief Director of Land Management and Agriculture Vasil'chikov in a 
letter of 6th October 1906 envisaged a resettlement budget of 19,200,000 
roubles for 1907, out of a budget demand for agriculture as a whole of 
41,730,000 roubles. This included the provision of infrastructure such as 
roads and irrigation systems which did not apparently form part of the 
calculations of government expenditure as detailed above. It also allowed for 
the preparation of a further 200,000 migrant plots and a total migrant subsidy 
allocation of eight and three-quarter million roubles together with spending 
increases for the improvement of medical facilities. (88) Disregarding 
exaggerated ministerial claims, the very considerable increase in expenditure 
on resettlement to which the treasury agreed, testifies to the urgency with 
which the reform of agriculture was viewed and the significant role which 
resettlement was now expected to play. 
Resettlement did not proceed smoothly. In 1907 particularly, the volume of 
migrants threatened to completely overwhelm the authorities. The Minister of 
Ways and Communication, defending his unenviable position of providing rail 
transport for the swelling numbers, declared the need for at least another two 
thousand special carriages. By the spring of 1907, he added, up to 40 
migrant trains a day needed to be despatched eastwards to Zlatoust on a line 
where rolling-stock was available for only twelve trains a day, excluding a few 
passenger trains. The clogging of the line meant that goods trains had 
virtually ceased to run. Proposals put fonward by the railway authorities in 
attempts to restrict the numbers were rejected by the government as an 
impediment to freedom to migrate. (89) 
Problems were not only evident on the railway. Encouraging out-migration 
from the European Russian provinces necessitated the rapid provision of a 
sufficient quantity of settler plots to accommodate the outflow and avoid the 
build-up of a backlog. The ukaz of 19th September 1906 released some one 
and a half million desyatinas of Cabinet lands in the Altai region to the Chief 
Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture, specifically for the 
settlement of migrants. (90) Yet, at the settlement areas, migrant plots 
continued to be in short supply with, declared the Chief Director of Land 
Management and Agriculture, only 153,000 available as at the beginning of 
1907, of which up to 40,000 were either unsuitable or as yet inaccessible. 
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(91) The government, despite its growing anxiety to quickly redistribute the 
population, had once again to introduce certain restrictions in response to 
representations from governors in Siberia that sufficient plots were not 
available. As from mid-August 1907, scouting permits would only t>e issued 
to those seeking to find plots in the provinces of Tobolsk and Tomsk. Permits 
would ho longer be granted to those wishing to settle in the Far East. Only 
those scouting parties organised by either land settlement commissions or 
the zemstvo would be deemed to be official. However, Central government 
was unwilling to go as far as halting all benefits to scouts to reduce the 
number of departures as recommended by the Chief Directorate. (92) The 
attempts to limit the numbers of scouts heading eastwards is reflected in the 
figures at Table I where the percentage of unlicensed scouts for 1908 and 
1909 rise dramatically despite a considerable drop in actual numbers (see 
Table I ) . 
1908 saw the largest number of migrants since the movement began. It was 
to be the peak year for out-migration with official figures showing that 
649,866 migrants passed through Chelyabinsk and Syzran (see Table I ). 
Yet, in January 1909, the government felt sufficiently sanguine about its 
ability to cope to plan the resumption of free scouting as from spring of that 
year in the Far East, in the Primorye, Amur and Transbaikal regions. In the 
other areas scouting was to be regulated to the amount of land available. (93) 
New initiatives for dealing with illegal migrants were proposed. These 
included reducing the number of illegal migrants settling on crown lands by 
only permitting the allocation of plots to illegals if these plots were in the gift 
of the Chief Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture. Families of 
illegal migrants arriving after 1st January 1909 would only be settled on 
migrant plots once legal migrants had been accommodated. A government 
circular of 30th December 1909 attempted to give some relief to the poorer 
migrants by declaring that some would be eligible for free travel, but only on 
application to the provincial governor and, through him, to the Chief 
Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture. Those who might apply 
were veterans of the war with Japan, families travelling to the Far East and 
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those whose resettlement was connected with the consolidation of land-plots 
in European Russia. Otherwise the government maintained its position on 
subsidies and declared that these would only be issued in the form of loans. 
(94) 
Expenditure on resettlement increased rapidly in 1908 and 1909, (see Table 
H) topping 23 million roubles in the latter year, a far cry from the five and half 
million roubles just three years earlier in 1906. Thereafter, steady increases 
were recorded until 1915 when expenditure fell, but only by a small margin 
relative to the drop in migrant numbers. Upper limits on the size of subsidies 
to migrants were laid down by the ukaz of 5th July 1912 which placed a 
ceiling of 400 roubles per household for those settling in the more far-flung 
regions of the Far East, Zabaikal, Primorskaya and Amurskaya, oblast and 
Sakhalin Island, and 250 roubles for those in other parts of Asiatic Russia. 
New settlers in old settler villages would be entitled to no more than half the 
laid down norms. (96) Sklyarov maintains that the migrant was rarely 
successful in receiving the full subsidy and there were often delays in issuing 
the subsidy entitlement by the local authorities. (99) Nevertheless, they were 
appropriately targetted, and the government could do little more by 
legislation. 
The years up to and including 1914 and the out-break of war in Europe, saw 
the expansion of resettlement areas, with new territories being opened up in 
the steppe regions of Turkestan and less hospitable environments of the Far 
East, in Zabaikal and Nerchinsk. Many of these areas were crown lands 
newly released for settlement. Government attempts to organise scouting 
were finally abandoned altogether, but efforts were planned to increase the 
provision of infomriation. (97) 1914 saw the last great wave of migrants to 
Siberia (see Table I ) . In 1915, as the effects of the war began to take their 
toll, numbers fell to 23,000 from 225,000 in 1914. By 1916, only a trickle of 
some 9,500 migrants made the journey to Siberia. 
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CHAPTER fV 
PEASANT MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT 
1861-1914 
What prompted peasants, despite all the difficulties, to uproot their families, 
abandon their lands, their homes and set off on an arduous journey of many 
months' duration to a destination of which they had only the haziest 
impression ? Undoubtedly rumours ran rife of more fruitful land, land so 
plentiful and so fertile that crops could not help but grow and livestock 
prosper and multiply. To a peasant now saddled with often little more than 
two desyatinas of land from which he had not only to feed his family but also 
raise the wherewithal to pay off redemption dues, taxes and other debts 
incurred, the belief that there existed fertile virgin land in plenty just waiting to 
be settled and cultivated must have proved irresistible. The idea of migration 
was in the air. There was population movement westwards from Europe to 
America and across the American continent. Building up now was the 
pressure for movement to the south and east from European Russia. 
Fundamentally the peasant's desire to leave European Russia is attributable 
to the lack of opportunity which his situation provided to make an adequate 
living. This in turn was caused by insufficient land to produce a reasonable 
agricultural yield, the relatively high level of redemption dues and taxes, the 
very rapid growth of population experienced by European Russia in the 
second half of the 19th century and lack of innovative farming practices. 
Perceived shortage of land was an acknowledged problem as early as 1826, 
and continued to be particularly acutely felt in the more densely populated 
fertile black-earth regions of European Russia. Following the Emancipation 
and the compulsory allocation of land plots to the emancipated serfs, the 
amount of land under peasant occupation was reduced. Zaionchkovskii 
quoting B.G. Litvak's figures shows that throughout thirteen uezds in Moscow 
province, peasant landholdings were reduced as a result of the 1861 Statute 
by amounts varying from 5.1% to as much as 23.2%. (1) Similarly in the 
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province of Vladimir, land occupied by peasants was reduced by 15.75% 
overall. (2) Furthermore, calculations of average plot-size in certain 
provinces, based on the numbers of peasants at the time of the 1858 census 
and the amount of land released to them following the Emancipation, show 
that plots were often markedly smaller than the minimum legal norm of five 
desyatinas per soul. This was true for provinces in non-black earth provinces 
and black-earth provinces alike. It was also true that former serfs were 
allocated considerably smaller land plots than those occupied by state 
peasants. The position then of a peasant in a province such as Poltava, 
which had a high ratio of former serfs to state peasants, was particularly 
invidious. Here, average plot-size per revision soul was 3.9 desyatinas for 
state peasants and 1.9 for the fonner proprietary serf. (3) 
The high land-values dictated by high soil fertility encouraged greater 
pressure from landowners to limit the amount of land allocated to 
emancipated serfs. The obverse argument should also have held true in that 
the greater the potential yield of the soil the smaller the area required by the 
peasant. However, the province also suffered from a greater density of 
population relative to the rest of Russia. The small plots and the reduced 
opportunity to rent or buy additional acreage made for a bleak prospect, 
particularly for the emancipated serf. There is agreement that a simple 
increase in the amount of land was not of itself the answer to the problem of 
the Russian countryside. Comparison between the amount of land held by 
the Russian peasant and that farmed by his west European counterpart show 
that the latter obtained greater productivity on smaller acreage. Russia, 
however, had a unique problem in its sheer size, the remoteness of many of 
its districts and the consequent under-development and lack of markets for 
produce, a situation almost encouraging subsistence level fanming. Lower 
than usual crop yields therefore had an immediate and direct impact on the 
peasant. Repartitional tenure provided little incentive to alter existing farming 
practices. Viewed from the peasant's perspective therefore, more land was 
the only solution. While Poltava is an extreme example, having the worst 
ratio of land to peasant, and the highest number of former proprietary serfs, 
(4) it is significant in that it was in provinces with similar problems to those of 
Poltava and in Poltava itself that the desire for resettlement was most 
strongly demonstrated by the peasantry. 
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There was an additional factor which made the outlook bleaker still, 
especially for the emancipated serf, namely the switch from ' barshchina', or 
payment in labour for use of land by working on the landowner's land, to ' 
obrok', that of paying redemption dues in money or in kind. As Pavlovsky 
explains, this was a quantum leap for the emancipated serf living in areas 
where agriculture was the chief form of livelihood who vras more used to the 
system of ' barshchina' and who had few other opportunities for wage-work. 
(5) 
The incidence of bad harvests, often leading to famine, was another powerful 
incentive to the peasant to seek improved conditions elsewhere. Yamzin 
notes the interesting parallel between the price of bread and the incidence of 
out-migration between 1861 and 1891 with numbers of out-migrants rising as 
bread prices rose. Similarly Yamzin shows that the high number of out-
migrants between 1885 and 1894 corresponded to the years of poor harvest 
and consequently high bread prices, while numbers declined in years of 
better harvests and lower bread prices. (6) 
Another powerful incentive to move away from the central provinces was the 
rapid growth in population which only exacerbated existing problems. In the 
second half of the 19th century, European Russia experienced one of the 
largest population growths in Europe. In 1858 all the provinces comprised a 
total of 59,330,792 inhabitants. At the time of the 1897 census the population 
had risen to 94,215,416 persons. This represents an increase of 59% in forty 
years despite such adverse factors as several years of widespread famine 
and a high child mortality rate (an average of 423 deaths per 1,000 live births 
was recorded during the period 1867-1881) for infants aged five and under. 
(7) Other factors working against such a growth in population were out-
migration (8) and a negligible rate of immigration. 
Such a surge in the growth of the population resulted in ever less land being 
available for the individual peasant farmer. Although more land was falling 
under peasant control either through purchase or renting, it was in insufficient 
quantity to keep up with the pace of population growth. In 1881 the Ministry 
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of the Interior estimated that over half a million peasants had plots of an area 
less than the legal minimum norm in the central provinces. (9) An example of 
the over-population and consequent difficulties occurring in the villages of the 
more fertile regions of European Russia is the case of a village in 
Shchigrovskii uezd in Kursk province. After Poltava, Kursk province suffered 
most from small allotments. After the Emancipation, the average plot-size for 
former state peasants was 4.2 desyatinas, but for fonner proprietary serfs 
only 2.3 desyatinas. (10) Here, in 1886 a population of 250 male souls was 
cultivating land which had been allotted at the time of the Emancipation to 95 
revision souls. As a result, many were driven either to hiring themselves out 
as labour to big farms in the neighbourhood or to renting additional land. The 
rents for land charged in this instance were as high as twenty-four roubles 
per desyatina. Any delay in payment was liable to a fine of an additional 2 
roubles and 60 kopecks. Similar punitive charges were made if redemption 
payments were overdue. Such circumstances encouraged whole villages to 
apply to move out of the area. (11) 
Rumours also played their part in stimulating the aspirations of the peasantry 
and the growth in demand for more land. Those who hired themselves out as 
seasonal labourers in the southern provinces and in Siberia returned with 
news of vast tracts of unpopulated, fertile land. Their numbers were 
considerable. In the year 1877-1878 450,000 annual passports, seasonal 
passes or authorisations of absence were issued in Vyatka province alone. 
(12) Sometimes the rumours were fuelled by government agencies as was 
the case when a memorandum, circulated by the Ministry of the Interior, 
referred to the tens of thousands of desyatinas of free land to be found in 
Kherson and Bessarabia stating that these lands might be occupied by any 
who wished to do so. (13) 
The extent to which the problems of rural areas affect the propensity of the 
peasant to migrate and the direction of migration has been examined by 
Barbara Anderson. In her study of the causes of migration in the late 19th 
century Russia, Anderson finds that migrants from areas where traditional 
agriculture is the predominant occupation and the level of education is low 
would tend to settle in what is termed an agricultural frontier destination. 
They have no wish to change their life-style, but simply seek increased space 
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in which to pursue it. Over time, population pressure increasingly becomes 
the motivating factor. On the other hand Anderson finds that population 
pressure has no noticeable effect on migration from the countryside of 
persons in a similar category to urban areas and puts forward the possibility 
that the migrants who headed south and eastwards were unlikely to have 
moved anywhere, despite increased population density, had this option not 
been open to them. (14) 
Pavlovsky suggests that population pressure was not the only factor at work 
and contends that an area which offers few or no alternative earning 
opportunities outside agriculture tends to supply a larger percentage of out-
migrants. He cites the example of Moscow which, in relative terms had 
efficient communications and a growing industrial base. Rural conditions 
were similar to other provinces with small land plots. The soil was not highly 
fertile yet the peasant did not feel driven to abandon his home in search of 
more land. In support of his thesis, Pavlovsky compares the 1.6% of all out-
migrants who hailed from the Moscow region with the 11.8% from the 
Western provinces, the 8.4% from Central Agricultural Region, the 10.5% 
from New Russia. (15) 
The two views are not necessarily Irreconcilable. Anderson's study highlights 
the existence of a ' hierarchy of destinations' for the migrant, with the migrant 
more modern in his outlook and with greater access to education and 
information, being attracted to the cities. The migrant less modern in his 
outlook, with a lower literacy level is more likely to be attracted to a 
destination similar to his place of origin. (16) The dearth of relatively large 
industrialised centres comparable to Moscow in late 19th century Russia 
gave few opportunities for the peasant in Poltava or Chernigov to widen his 
horizons or to seek supplementary means of livelihood. For him the only 
option was to seek more land, where vacant, cultivable land existed. 
The Emancipation Act did not stimulate a sudden inaease in the numbers of 
peasant migrants, although the Ministry of State Domains received many 
requests from landless peasants, the' darstvenniki' * (cf. pp. 43 and 45), 
* See also pp. 43 and 45 
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to be relocated on free Cabinet Lands. (17) There was, however, a steady 
rise in the number of out-migrants, although estimates of the numbers of 
peasant migrants prior to 1885 are variable and unreliable due to the 
absence of migrant registration. (18) However, an approximation of numbers 
of out-migrants between 1860 and 1885 is put at 300,000 persons, including 
both sexes (19), an average of 12,000 per year. Coquin estimates at 30,000 
a year the number of migrants to all destinations during the 1870s, with 
perhaps half the number heading for Siberia. (20) The number of illegal 
settlers in Siberia between 1861 and 1868 remained negligible with an 
average of little more than one thousand a year. (21) 
Between 1885 and 1895 a total of some 161,671 out-migrants were counted, 
an average of 14,697 per year. (22) Yamzin's figure for the number of out-
migrants from 1885 to 1895 inclusive is considerably higher at 469,270, an 
annual average of 42,660 with 1895 as the year when numbers of out-
migrants rose rapidly. (23) The primary migrant destinations at this time were 
the southern and eastern provinces of European Russia, especially the 
Caucasus and the Don basin. The law of 13th April 1868, outlining 
conditions for settlement in Samara and Orenburg, (24) coupled with the 
1869 special governmental committee on resettlement, which recommended 
that 100,000 desyatinas of land should be released annually for resettlement 
in the provinces of Samara, Astrakhan, Orenburg and Kherson, indicates a 
growing easteriy orientation. (25) (See Map I) The amount of land thus 
released was slightly less than was required to accommodate annually 
12,000 male settlers with an average each of eight desyatinas of land, and 
only enough to provide 6,000-7,000 male souls with an average of fifteen 
desyatinas of land. Cleariy there was little margin to cater for any increase in 
the numbers of migrants. 
In 1865, Cabinet Lands of the Altai region of Tomsk province in Western 
Siberia were first opened up to settlement. In an attempt to recruit labour for 
the nearby mines, fifteen desyatinas of land and unrestricted use of the 
forests for a yeariy rent of six roubles were being offered to any state peasant 
who would volunteer to settle there. (26) Between 1861 and 1862, 30,904 
revision souls settled in Tomsk province (27), primarily in the Altai. (28) 
Semirech'e received 7,000 settlers as a result of government recruitment of 
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volunteers in the ten years following the Emancipation. (29) Other settlement 
areas were in the provinces of Tobolsk and Yenisei where several hundred 
families had settled by the later 1870s, and to a lesser extent Akmolinsk and 
Turgai. (30) 
The Circular of 13 April 1868 (see page 43) which set out requirements for 
legal resettlement also confirmed the fact that the free land existed in these 
areas. In many cases this was enough to fuel the peasant's desire to move. 
The bad harvest of 1867 also played its part. The year 1868-1869 saw 
between 20,000 and 30,000 male souls on the move, primarily from the 
provinces of Tula, Penza, Kazan, Voronezh and Ekaterinoslav. (32) 
Yamzin uses figures of out-migration taken from research conducted by 
Poltava zemstvo to demonstrate the predominance of areas other than 
Siberia, but primarily the Caucasus and New Russia, as migrant destinations. 
Between 1861 and 1867 50% of out-migrants from Poltava province headed 
for the Caucasus and 36% to New Russia. During the period 1877 and 1886 
between 50% and 60% of the province's out-migrants made their way to the 
Caucasus, while less than five percent headed east towards Siberia. The 
remainder settled in New Russia and a few on the western bank of the Volga. 
By 1892-1893 however, Asiatic Russia accounted for more than 70% of 
Poltava province's out-migrants, New Russia for just over 3% and the 
Caucasus for little more than ,15%. Between 1896 and 1900 Siberia was the 
destination of 87% of all out-migrants from Poltava province. (33) 
What caused this very sharp increase in the percentage of migrants to 
Siberia ? The more easily accessible lands which had been available were 
simply filling up. By the mid-1880s Stavropol declared itself unable to 
accommodate any more settlers on state land. Other areas of the Caucasus 
followed suit as did the provinces of Tauride, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and 
Samara. In 1890 the government officially suspended all granting of land to 
migrants in Samara province. (34) In 1892 the ban was extended to the 
south-eastern provinces of Saratov, Orenburg and Ufa. (35) As discussed in 
Chapter III, the government was also becoming reconciled to the idea of 
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pressing for more peasant colonisation of Siberia and had begun pursuing 
policies to this end. 
With previous migrant destinations now closed there was little option for the 
peasant but to venture further eastwards into Siberia and the steppe lands of 
Asiatic Russia. The land surveying and maricing out of settlers' plots in 
Siberia, begun in 1885, took place mainly in Tomsk province which, between 
1885 and 1893 accommodated 75% of all out-migrants from European 
Russia. (36) Yet progress was slow, by 1892 only six thousand plots had 
been prepared, to accommodate an average number of arrivals per year of 
32,519 persons including both sexes. (37) 
Government resettlement procedures were out-paced by the demand for 
more land. Between 1889 and 1892 17,289 pennits were issued to peasant 
families, but 28,911 families actually migrated out of their home provinces. 
In 1892 the issue of permits to resettle was suspended altogether due to a 
shortage of settler plots. (38) 
The opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway project in 1893 provided a faster 
means of reaching a specific destination at reasonable cost to the migrant, 
but also helped to stimulate the growth in numbers of out-migrants. The 
peasant who would not have contemplated making the arduous and lengthy 
journey by river and overland would have been encouraged by the offer of a 
relatively short rail journey at reduced rates. Despite the advantage of a 
shorter journey time, conditions for rail travellers were also grim. Aref ev 
describes how, in 1896, migrants were transported, with their baggage, from 
Chelyabinsk for up to seven days in very crowded goods-wagons with no 
heating, lighting or sanitary facilities. The migrant points which had been set 
up to provide shelter, food and medical attention to migrants en route were 
far from adequate. In eariy 1896, Chelyabinsk, the most important of these, 
could only muster one barrack-block and eight large tents in accommodation 
facilities, or sufficient to shelter 550 persons. Chelyabinsk canteen was able 
to provide 800 meals each day for a small charge of two kopecks. The 
hospital had only eight beds. Yet, in 1896 117,168 migrants, excluding 
scouts, passed through Chelyabinsk and Syzran. Things improved through 
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1896 with the availability of more rolling stock and the building of additional 
accommodation blocks and hospitals. Migrants travelling the longer route by 
river to Tyumen suffered much less from lack of shelter, food or medical 
assistance. (39) 
The census of 1897 provided the first statistical data which accurately 
gauged the shifts in population within the Russian Empire. Tikhonov's 
analysis of the census results presents some interesting findings on the 
scope and direction of migration by 1897. Tikhonov shows that the majority 
of out-migrants up to 1897 not only numerically, but also in percentage terms 
(12.9%), hailed from the six provinces of the central agricultural region: 
Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Ryazan, Tambov and Tula. These six together with 
the three provinces of the Ukraine or Little Russia Poltava, Chernigov and 
Kharkov accounted for the bulk of out-migrants, over twice as many as the 
nine provinces of the industrial non-agricultural region, Vladimir, Kaluga, 
Kostroma, Nizhegorod, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl, the next 
most popular region of origin for out-migrants. (40) From 89 provinces of the 
Russian Empire it is the provinces of the central agricultural region and the 
Ukraine headed by Kursk, Poltava, Voronezh, Ryazan and Tambov which 
provided the greatest out-flow of migrants. The recipients of this out-flow 
were primarily the capital areas, the Kuban in the northern Caucasus, Tomsk 
in western Siberia, the provinces of New Russia. (41) The areas of 
settlement, however, of migrants from the central agricultural region are 
markedly different from those of migrants from the Ukraine. Migrant out-flow 
from the former headed, in descending order of popularity, towards New 
Russia, the capital areas. Western Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. 
There was also significant movement from one to another of the six provinces 
comprising the region. Out-flow from the Ukraine however headed towards 
the Northern Caucasus, New Russia and Western Siberia. Very few made 
for the capital areas and there was much less movement from one Ukrainian 
province to another. (42) 
Between 1896 and 1911 a total of 3,288,999 out-migrants and 776,024 
scouts left the provinces of European Russia for Asiatic Russia and Siberia 
through Chelyabinsk and Syzran (see Table I ) . (43) The peak years for out-
migration were 1907, 1908 and 1909 following the Stolypin reforms, and the 
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government's ever increasing encouragement of migration. The years of low 
out-migration were 1897, 1904 and 1905 which saw the Russo-Japanese war 
and the revolution sparked by peasant and urban worker unrest, although the 
years 1901 to 1905 saw a marked decline generally. The migrants set off 
from all parts of European Russia, with the black-earth provinces continuing 
to provide the majority of migrants after 1897 but the percentage values of 
out-migrants from these provinces declined as numbers from other provinces 
rose. Yamzin's figures show that for the whole period 1885 to 1909 the 
black-earth provinces provided 50.8% of the total number of out-migrants 
(see Map I ). The percentage of out-migrants from the north-eastern 
provinces was at its highest of 20.4% between 1885 and 1889. It fell 
considerably thereafter and during the whole period provided only 4.5% of 
the total number of migrants. A steady flow migrants left the south-eastern 
provinces during the period, especially through the 1890s, accounting for 
9.2% of the total. The southern steppe regions and western provinces saw 
negligible numbers of out-migrants during the first five years 1885-1889, but 
percentage numbers rose to 14.1% and 22.3% respectively between 1900 
and 1905, peaking at a time when migrant numbers generally were mari^edly 
reduced. (44) 
The main settlement areas In Siberia were located in Western Siberia. It is 
calculated that between 1861 and 1897 40% of Siberia's increase in 
population was attributable to the arrival of new settlers. In some regions 
however, the numbers of settlers were a particularly significant factor in 
population growth. This was especially so in Tomsk province, where new 
settlers accounted for 67% of the increase in population between 1861 and 
1897. (45) Even in the four southerty regions of Yenisei province, between 
1881 and 1890, 37.2% of the annual growth rate was attributable to new 
settlers. (46) The extent of Russia's colonisation is Illustrated by the findings 
in Aziatskava Rossiva that by 1911 the indigenous population of Siberia 
comprised only 12.7% of the total, while Russians accounted for 84.6%. (47) 
Between 1896 and 1913 more than half of all settlers in Siberia settled in 
Tomsk province. By 1914, more than three quarters of the total population of 
Siberia lived in Western Siberia. (48) There was spreading settlement 
southwards into the steppe regions of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Turgai. 
A few migrants made their way further east but the length and arduousness 
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of the journey doubtless deterred many. Between 1906 and 1914 only 10.3% 
of settlers continued beyond Lake Baikal. (49) 
Over the years there were changes in the sort of peasants who made their 
way to Siberia. Prior to the 1890s, out-migrants were primarily state 
peasants. Traditionally they had enjoyed a greater degree of personal 
mobility and freedom than the proprietary serf, to seek wage-work in other 
areas. As a group they were arguably more used to leaving their homes and 
venturing into little-knovwi territories. Resettlement legislation in the first half 
of the 19th century directed solely at state peasants, had made them aware 
of opportunities in distant regions, as did shared experiences of seasonal 
work. New settlers in Yeniseisk province between 1865 and 1890 comprised 
64.7% former state peasants and only 8.6% former proprietary serfs, (50) 
Former state peasants were similariy dominant in Tomsk province in 1894 
where they made up 51.2% of ail new settlers and 67.4% in the Altai region 
alone. (51) By the 1890s more former serfs were encouraged to attempt 
resettlement. The famine years of 1890-91, rural overcrowding, the start of 
the Trans-Siberian rail project, new legislation in 1896 which reduced the 
bureaucratic procedure, facilitated departure from the commune and 
acknowledged the significance of resettlement, prompted greater numbers of 
former serfs to seek land away from their over-crowded home provinces. 
Table III shows the number of out-migrants to Siberia, excluding scouts for 
1896 was 177,168. This is an enormous figure relative to the average annual 
number of out-migrants from 1885-1895 discussed at page 80, the highest 
estimate being Yamzin's at 42,660 out-migrants per year. 
It is hardly surprising, in view of the many difficulties faced by the migrant 
peasants both en route and at the place of settlement, that some were unable 
to establish themselves successfully. Upon arrival at their planned 
destination, settlers were often confronted with a lack of precise information 
as to the location of their plot of land. Surveying work had not always been 
completed. Prospective settlers were sent from pillar to post in search of 
their plot. Plots were not always adequately supplied with water or wood and 
were frequently unsuitable for settlement. By this time, thoroughly 
demoralised and sometimes destitute, having expended all their resources on 
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the outward journey, some migrants were left with little option but to make 
their way home again. (52) Yamzin found that the most fequently cited 
reason given by returnees between 1896 and 1910 for their failure to settle in 
Siberia was the lack of financial resources and able-bodied working hands or 
family members, together with the few opportunities for wage-wori<. Other 
causes were crop failure, and unsuitability of a plot due to poor soil, 
incompatible climate and lack of wood or water. The absence of sufficient 
financial and manpower resources assumed greater importance after the turn 
of the century. Eariier, plot unsuitability was the most frequently given reason 
for settlers to return. (53) This was not simply a matter of turning back, but 
required a further permit, issued upon presentation of an acceptance 
certificate from the commune of origin and proof that all outstanding debts 
had been paid. For those who had arrived in Siberia without the necessary 
permits, the illegal or unlicensed migrants, the situation was similariy dismal. 
Without permits they were not entitled to a settler plot and were often obliged 
to attach themselves to old-settler villages for payment, in many cases, of a 
substantial fee. (54) The only other possibility, were they to remain in 
Siberia, was to hire themselves out as labourers. 
Many found the problems Insuperable and turned back towards European 
Russia and their home provinces. These were the returnees. Dubrovskii 
unequivocally states that the numbers of returnees demonstrated the failure 
of Tsarist resettlement policies and the inability of the authorities to 
satisfactorily accommodate migrants in the settlement areas. (55) 
Examination of different sets of figures inevitably produces different results, 
despite the common base. In this case figures are based on the numbers of 
migrants passing through Chelyabinsk and Syzran. In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri. 
percentage numbers of returnees are based on the total number of migrants 
travelling in family groups together with the numbers of single migrants. The 
percentage number of returnees each year is calculated on the basis of the 
total number of returnees, in family groups and individuals returning within 
any one year as a percentage of the total number of out-migrants in that 
same year. The results, also utilised by Dubrovskii, of this method, present 
some astonishingly high rates of returnees, indicating a return rate , for 
example, of 36.3% in 1910, 61.3% in 1911 and 28.5% in 1912. (56) While 
these figures may be useful in demonstrating an overall annual percentage 
value in the number of returnees (9% for period 1906-1909 and 30.4% for 
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period 1910-1914 ), they are not able to indicate trends. At Table III are 
given the annual percentage figures of out-migrants who returned within the 
same year for the years 1896 to 1911, based on the numbers of out-migrants 
excluding scouts and individuals. The years from 1906 to 1911, with the 
exception of 1910, show generally lower percentage rates of returnees 
returning within the same year than hitherto, despite the very much greater 
actual numbers of out-migrants. For these years, the return rate did not 
exceed 5% of the total number of out-migrants. These more favourable 
figures reflect both the government's investment in peasant resettlement 
through subsidies to migrant families and preparation of settler plots as 
shown at Table III, and possibly an improvement in the organisation of 
settlement procedure through the newly restructured Resettlement 
Administration. The downward trend in the number of returnees is evident. 
Ironically, the year of the lowest percentage rate of same year returnees, 
1908, is also the year of the highest out-migration. 
However, Table III also shows a down side. The overall number of returnees 
rose sharply after 1906 which is predictable in view of the growing numbers 
of out-migrants. Inevitably, 1907, which saw the biggest leap in numbers of 
out-migrants, also had the highest percentage of returnees returning within 
the same year, although Sklyarov claims that a rumour circulating in 1907 
that the govemment would make available ten million desyatinas of land for 
sale to peasants through the Peasant Land Bank, ( cf. p. 96 ) prompted many 
in difficulties to return. (57) After 1907 the percentage rate of retumees 
returning within the same year was falling, but actual numbers of retumees 
were increasing. This indicates a rising number of longer tenn settlers 
returning to European Russia. Two factors which may have influenced this 
development were the poorer quality of land plots which were being issued, 
often virgin land requiring much work in clearance and preparation before 
sowing could begin, and secondly, the developments in land reform which 
were beginning to take effect, making the rural situation in European Russia 
more attractive than it had been. The highest numbers of retumees were 
recorded in 1910 and 1911. Numbers dropped substantially thereafter for the 
next three years until 1914 despite increasing out-migration, (see Table III) 
but the number of same year retumees dips sharply for those two years. 
Inversely, the number of returning longer-term settlers rises. It might be 
suggested that many of these were the poorer peasants who, finding 
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themselves suddenly free from the commune, had rushed eastwards in 
overwhelming numbers in 1907,1908 and 1909 only to find the problems of 
settlement too great. 
The fall in the number of out-migrants between 1910 and 1911 (see Table I) 
may also be linked to improving rural conditions in European Russia. With 
the advent of the Stolypin reforms, despite the fact that resettlement came to 
be regarded as a necessary element in the collection of measures designed 
to alleviate peasant grievances, the onus remained on the peasant to initiate 
the resettlement process. If the impetus to migrate came from the peasant, 
the fact that actual numbers of out-migrants fell back after 1909, despite 
population growth, simpler procedures and annual increases in expenditure 
on resettlement suggests that certain factors were at work which may have 
reduced the level of grievance felt by the peasant. The following may have 
had varying degrees of influence : firstly, that more land was passing into 
peasant hands thanks to the activities of the Peasant Land Bank, secondly, 
that the effects of the Stolypin refomis which allowed the peasant to 
consolidate his plot of land and become an individual peasant fanner were 
beginning to be felt and thirdly, that growing industrial development provided 
markets for peasant produce, thus stimulating the peasant's desire to harvest 
greater yields, encouraging more innovative fanning practices. Peasant 
grievances were being addressed. The conditions of his tenure of land had 
changed offering him greater security and potential for improving his 
economic position. Although numbers of out-migrants were rising again in 
the years 1912 to 1914, the rise was more gradual. The number of returnees 
continued to fall (see Table 111 ). Resettlement was beginning to proceed 
more smoothly and at a moderate pace after the frenetic activity of the 
Stolypin reforms. 
The extent to which resettlement helped ease the problems of land-hunger in 
European Russia cannot be gauged reliably in view of the many other factors 
which came into play to alleviate peasant disaffection and thus the peasant's 
inclination to migrate. Between 1896 and 1911 a total of 4,108,410 migrants 
and scouts made their way to Siberia, the majority in the three years 1907, 
1908 and 1909, a yearly average of 263,000 over the sixteen year period. 
Between 1897 and 1913 the population of Russia grew by 40.1 million 
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people, an average of 2.4 million per year. (58) These figures suggest that 
resettlement on its own would have had little impact on the problems in rural 
areas, despite Yamzin's argument that out-migration considerably reduced 
the rate of natural increase in some areas of European Russia. (59) 
Whether the peasant benefitted from his settlement in Siberia is challenged 
by some. Sklyarov for example, stresses that new settlers did not experience 
an improvement in living standards across the board and that assessments 
should not be reached on the basis of comparisons between the peasant's 
economic situation or the amount of land under his control at the place of 
origin and his place of settlement. Rather, he compares the economic level 
of peasants within Siberia showing that the well-off peasants, those 
cultivating over 9 desyatinas, controlled 46% of the cultivable land yet only 
made up 16.7% of the population. Middle peasants, those cultivating 
between 3 and 9 desyatinas, comprised 42% of the population and farmed 
41.8% of cultivable land. The remaining 42.3%, poor peasants, had only 
12.2% of cultivable land. (60) Yet Sklyarov acknowledges the findings of a 
survey conducted in 1913 of the 18,488 households, which showed that the 
majority of households 8,715, (47%), were cultivating between 3 and 9, 
desyatinas. Those farming over 9 desyatinas were 3,455 households, 
(18.6% ). 6,318 households, (34% ), were farming up to three desyatinas. 
The survey also showed that the number of migrants in Siberia with no land 
under cultivation dropped over time and that the longer term settlers were 
farming increased acreage. (61) Settlement and land cultivation took time but, 
economic well-being was growing in proportion with the increasing duration of 
established settlement. In Krest'vanstvo Sibiri. it is maintained that Siberian 
peasants were better equipped with agricultural machinery than their 
European Russian counterparts, although much of it was in the hands of 
kulaks, the well-to-do peasant. Agricultural yields per desyatina in Siberia 
rose rapidly. During the period 1911-1915 Siberia was producing an average 
annual yield of 286.2 million poods, an increase of 66% above yields in the 
first years of the century. European Russia could only manage an increase 
of 11%. (62) Other indicators, for example, the number of livestock per 
household were also higher in Siberia than In European Russia. 
Nevertheless there were many who were not able to settle in Sit>eria, vwho did 
not have enough financial resources, family members to work the fields, 
equipment. Yamzin paints a dismal picture particulariy of the plight of illegal 
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migrants in Siberia. According to figures of the 1909 census in Tomsl< 
province alone there remained 454,192 persons without a fixed abode. (63) 
For those who were able to establish themselves, who had the necessary 
resources and entrepreneurial spirit, resettlement was undoubtedly of benefit. 
For Siberia, resettlement brought rapid Russian colonisation. It was above all 
a rural colonisation, one which Soviet writers suggest delayed the 
development of capitalism in European Russia by providing land for peasants 
who might otherwise have been forced into urban wagework in European 
Russia. For the government, resettlement helped to defuse mounting rural 
unrest. To this end it was vigorously encouraged from 1906 onwards. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ROLE OF THE ZEMSTVO IN MIGRATION AND 
RESETTLEMENT 
It is intended in this chapter to examine the role of the ' Zemstvo ' in relation 
to the migration movement, whether this was one of rendering assistance or 
hindering the migration of the peasants out of European Russia either by 
implementing the policies of central government or by initiatives taken at a 
local level. 
The Statute on Zemstvo Institutions was promulgated on 1st January 1864. 
(1) It provided for the establishment of Zemstvo Samoupravlenie, or local 
self-government institutions in thirty-three provinces (guberniia) of European 
Russia, and in each district (uezd) within those provinces. These institutions 
of self-government were to consist of an assembly and an executive board in 
each province and district. Deputies to the district assemblies were chosen 
by three electoral groups based on property qualification, while members of 
the provincial assemblies were elected by the district assemblies from among 
their own number. The governor retained overall responsibility for the 
conduct of local affairs within each province. (2) 
The social composition of the new zemstvo favoured the gentry and urban 
population rather than the peasantry, although representation from each of 
the three social classes, the private landowners, the townspeople and the 
peasantry was guaranteed. Each class had its own electoral curia from which 
to choose deputies to the zemstvo assemblies. The casting of direct votes for 
deputies to the assemblies was only granted to those with specified amounts 
of property or other wealth. These constituted the first electoral group. 
Group two comprised members of the urban population excluded from group 
one through insufficient property or wealth, who elected representatives to 
vote on their behalf for deputies to the zemstvo assemblies. Group three 
were the ' volost' elders who voted for deputies to the zemstvo assemblies 
having themselves been elected by commune elders and representatives of 
each ten peasant householders, who had in turn been chosen by heads of 
peasant households. (3) 
87 
The Zemstvo Statute laid down specific areas which were henceforth to be 
the responsibility of the new institutions. These included the fields of public 
health and education, veterinary facilities, public works, which encompassed 
the maintenance of hospitals and prisons and the construction of local roads 
and administrative buildings, fire prevention and administration of fire 
insurance, encouraging local trade and industry and holding local elections. 
(4) In short, the overall brief of the zemstvo was to manage affairs relating to 
the local economic well-being and the needs of every province and every 
district. (5) The problems of agriculture, land-shortage and increasingly the 
migration movement should have fitted very naturally into this wide schedule, 
but zemstvos were often reluctant to recognise the mounting hardships of 
rural life and their fundamental causes. Veselovskii, author of the definitive 
work on the zemstvo movement, Istoriva zemstva za sorok let, could find only 
one district zemstvo, that of Novouzenskoye in Samara province, which 
admitted to the existence of land-shortage in the 1860s. By the mid-1870s 
Veselovskii lists only the provincial zemstvos of Tver, Yaroslavl, Moscow, 
Kostroma, Tauride and Kherson as having taken any steps to extend peasant 
land-holdings, despite the findings of zemstvo-commissioned investigations 
which showed that the peasants' economic status had deteriorated as a result 
of land-shortage. He attributes this to the gentry-weighted social composition 
of the zemstva assemblies which failed to consider problems from the point of 
view of the peasantry. (6) 
By the mid-1870s, the problems of illiteracy, lack of resources and general 
backwardness of the Russian peasantry as contributive to the agrarian 
debility in rural areas were generally acknowledged. Most allowed that land 
shortage was also a factor. The solution was seen to lie in increasing the 
amount of land held by the peasantry. There were two options : either to 
increase the purchasing power of the peasantry by extending credit 
specifically for the purpose of buying land, or to encourage the vacating of 
over-crowded areas through migration. At this stage central government 
opted to increase peasant land-holdings within European Russia by 
extending credit rather than promoting widespread migration. The Peasant 
Land Bank was founded by statute on 18 May 1882 and opened 7th April 
1883 as a state institution within the Ministry of Finance. Its brief was to 
facilitate the purchase of land by peasants of whatever means, if the owner 
wished to sell. The Bank's branches would be managed by appointees from 
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the Ministry of Finance with the help of three assistants, one appointed by the 
local provincial governor and two others chosen by the Provincial Zemstvo 
Assembly. The Bank's duties included helping the purchaser and the seller 
to complete their transaction and make available loans for this purpose not 
exceeding 125 roubles per male soul or 500 roubles per household. (7) 
Some provincial zemstvos, notably Tver and to some extent Poltava, had 
already introduced limited credit facilities for land purchase although the 
schemes were not always exclusively designated for the peasantry. Others, 
while considering the arguments, failed to act positively in providing credit for 
peasant land purchases, although by 1879, twenty-four zemstvos voted in 
favour of a more active role for zemstvos in this field. (8) 
There were isolated cases in the 1870s of the initiatives proposed by 
individual zemstvos to encourage out-migration from particular provinces, but 
none achieved a marked change in policy towards migrants. As early as 
1870 and later in 1873, the Chernigov provincial zemstvo reaffirmed that the 
best way to improve the economic situation of the province would be to 
encourage out-migration. (9) However, it was not until 1876 that the zemstvo 
adopted a motion petitioning central government to reschedule redemption 
payments to facilitate the departure of peasants from the province. (10) In 
1876, the Orel district zemstvo in Vyatka province agreed a motion to petition 
the provincial assembly for finance for the issue of grants to those who 
wished to move to other areas. The grants were to have been awarded to 
inhabitants of those 'volosti' where climatic and soil conditions made it 
impossible to farm successfully or feed a family. The proposal was accepted 
by the provincial assembly which declared its readiness to assign more than 
1,000 roubles to assist in resettlement. (11) In 1875, the Voronezh provincial 
zemstvo urged the creation of a bureau specifically to encourage peasants to 
migrate out of the province. (12) A further proposal in 1880 within Voronezh 
zemstvo recommended the establishment of a resettlement department to 
operate in conjunction with each provincial zemstvo, which would provide 
statistical information for ready reference on areas of vacant land, land 
prices, itineraries and expenses of journey. (13) 
Prior to 1880-1881 the zemstvos, for the most part, either opposed the notion 
of resettlement or remained indifferent to it. In addition to the examples given 
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above, a few district zemstvos were prepared to see some merit in the idea, 
but only on a very qualified basis. One supported resettlement, but only from 
those areas of extreme land-shortage. Another proposed that only a 
specified percentage of the population should be permitted to migrate. 
Another, while agreeing with the principle of migration, declared that it would 
only lead to useful results when the population had reached a higher degree 
of development and agricultural know-how. Still others, among them the 
provincial zemstva of Novgorod, Ekaterinsolav and Ufa, viewed resettlement 
from the opposite perspective and were anxious to attract settlers. (14) 
In 1880 and 1881 the press was conducting heated debates on the question 
of migration and resettlement and was subsequently barred from dealing with 
the subject. Resettlement was also brought to the forefront of zemstvo 
attention as a result of a government initiative to seek out relevant zemstvo 
opinion and ideas. In 1881 zemstvo representatives were invited to attend 
the special commission to consider the question of peasant resettlement set 
up by the Ministry of the Interior. The commission concluded that steps 
needed to be taken to assess the number of out-migrants from the Russian 
provinces. To this end, on 10th July 1881, as part of the Vremennye pravila o 
pereselenii krest'yan na svobodnye kazennye zemli, the first migrant office 
was established by the Ministry of the Interior in Syzran district, Simbirsk 
province to monitor the flow of migrants. However, the findings, as 
Yadrintsev explains, remained largely unpublished. (15) No further practical 
measures were taken as a result of the commission. 
Following the debate within the zemstvo assemblies, the provincial zemstvos 
of Vladimir, Voronezh, Pskov, Tula, Chernigov, Tauride and Tambov now 
declared themselves to be in favour of organised resettlement. Tambov 
provincial zemstvo in particular advocated unrestricted resettlement, one 
member even proposing the allocation of funds to ease the process of 
migration for its peasants. (16) Several district zemstvos also declared their 
approval. 
An examination of the process of consideration within the Poltava zemstvo 
assemblies illustrates the lack of urgency with which most zemstvos viewed 
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the question of resettlement. It is necessary to bear in mind that Poltava was 
one of the provinces most seriously affected by population density and that it 
later came to be regarded as a pioneer of zemstvo involvement in migration. 
In response to the government initiative, the zemstvo board (uprava) began 
to examine the question of migration as it affected the province and prepared 
a report which it put before the provincial zemstvo assembly in 1881. The 
report considered that to encourage migration from Poltava province would 
not be in the best interests of the province. (17) Zenchenko does not 
elaborate further, but Veselovskii indicates that this negative attitude rested 
on the premise that a population surplus to the requirements of agriculture 
would stimulate industrial development (18), by providing a large reserve of 
cheap labour. 
The provincial zemstvo board's report added, however, that this did not 
exclude the possibility that in extreme circumstances, when out-migration was 
considered necessary, measures might be swiftly organised in order to avoid 
the needless waste of the population's strength and resources. The zemstvo 
assembly proposed that further consideration of the migration question 
should be delayed until the following year and asked the board (uprava) to 
continue its study. In 1882 the matter was passed to the district (uezd) 
assemblies for their consideration. The conclusions of the district assemblies 
together with the revised report were then submitted to the provincial 
assembly in 1883 for further consideration, but none was given either that 
year or the following year. In short, the question of migration was not a 
priority. The report contained two proposals : one was that responsibility for 
dealing with the problems of migrants and migrant workers should be given to 
agencies established for that purpose at provincial and district level ; the 
second, that a meeting should be convened at regional (oblastnoi) level to 
consider measures to regulate migration and the out-flow of migrant workers. 
However, another ten years was to pass before the subject of migration and 
resettlement was again brought before the Poltava provincial zemstvo 
assembly. (19) 
The zemstvo assemblies of Poltava province were not alone in dragging their 
feet on the matter of resettlement. Between 1882 and 1891, most either 
ignored or rejected outright the notion that resettlement was fast becoming a 
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necessity, seeing the duty of the zemstvo to be that of ascertaining the 
causes of migration and eliminating them, rather than of encouraging the 
movement. (20) Few zemstvo assemblies, it seemed, were willing to 
recognise the importance of land-shortage as a spur to migration and few 
saw the possible economic benefits, despite the fact that one of their 
declared objectives was to raise economic conditions. Not until the 1890s did 
resettlement again become a subject for deliberation in the zemstvo 
assemblies. 
Prior to this development, however, there took place on 12 June 1890, a 
reform of the zemstvo. Henceforth, the zemstvo institutions would be brought 
within the framework of the state bureaucracy. Zemstvo chairmen and 
executive members were now to become fully-fledged civil servants, but more 
importantly the reform changed the electoral groups. These were now to be 
defined by estate ( soslovie) rather than by property. The three new groups 
were : noble, non-noble but excluding the peasantry and peasant members of 
communities. As Dorothy Atkinson notes, all independent peasant 
landowners and all private peasant landholding associations were now left 
with no representation in the zemstvo assemblies. Peasants had been 
increasing their representation in the landowners' electoral group, by 1885 
accounting for one-tenth of electors. At the same time there had been a 
small decline in the number of zemstvo deputies elected by the peasant 
communes. (21) 
The composition of the Poltava provincial zemstvo assembly between 1890 
and 1893 reflects the near total absence of peasant deputies. Of the sixty-
two members of the provincial assembly, fifty-nine were gentry. Thirty-one 
members of the sixty-two had received higher education, twenty-eight had 
received secondary education and three elementary education only. Only 
two members owned less than 200 desyatinas of land. (22) Such a line-up 
was unlikely to fully appreciate the problems caused by rural over-crowding. 
However, bad harvests culminating in the widespread famine of 1891 
prompted some response and in 1892, a revisory commission of the new 
Poltava provincial zemstvo assembly proposed that the zemstvo petition 
92 
central government to grant those short of land in the province the right to 
move and settle on free Cabinet lands and receive assistance to do so. 
Despite agreement on such a course of action, it was felt that further study 
was needed before a petition of this nature could be submitted. To this end 
the Poltava provincial office of statistics was given the task of compiling 
material on the migration movement out of Poltava province. (23) This 
measure, directed towards studying the question of migration, to passive 
observation, made little practical contribution towards influencing the 
movement or assisting the migrants. Nevertheless it constituted a radical 
change of attitude. It was the first comprehensive, long-term assessment by 
a zemstvo, or any other body, of the impact of out-migration on a province. 
Similar studies were conducted in the provinces of Voronezh, Vyatka, 
Chernigov and Kharkov. * 
The famine of 1891 stimulated debate on peasant migration within other 
zemstvos and more provincial zemstvos were now prepared to support the 
idea, among them ; Voronezh, Kursk, Perm, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tula and 
Chernigov. Old habits die hard, however, and although approval was given 
in principle to the idea of resettlement, it was also stipulated that landowners' 
interests should not be compromised. The general view was that although 
migration could not be halted completely, attempts should be made to limit 
numbers to those who could not find work locally or, whose presence, if they 
remained, would reduce the average plot-size to below the norm. (24) 
Loans to facilitate the purchase of migrants' land by those remaining were 
introduced in 1894 by Poltava uezd zemstvo which allocated 3,000 roubles 
for this purpose. This was intended to work to both the migrant's benefit, who 
would be able to realise his assets more speedily, obtaining the funds 
necessary for his journey, and to the advantage of those remaining in that 
they could extend their land-holdings by ownership on favourable terms, 6% 
interest over ten years. 
* • Pereselenie iz Poltavskoi gubernii 1861-1893 ' and ' 1894-1901 ' was 
published in 1900 and 1905 respectively. I. Lisanevich compiled a short 
study of peasant out-migration from Voronezh province between 1870 and 
1882. N.N. Romanov's 'Pereseleniya krest'yan Vyatskoi gubemii ' was 
published in 1880. 
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The loan allocation was raised to 5,000 roubles in 1894 and neariy 6,000 in 
1897, but the numbers assisted in this way were insignificant: only 42 loans 
were issued in 1897. (25) 
The district and provincial zemstvos of Orel province vigorously debated the 
subject of resettlement in 1899. Nine out of twelve of the province's district 
zemstvos were in favour of unrestricted migration. (26) More and more 
district and provincial zemstvos recognised that migration was a ready-made, 
popular solution to one aspect of the agrarian problem blighting European 
Russia. It was not a solution accepted readily, but rather represented a 
recognition that the movement was unstoppable anyway and a hope that 
unrestricted migration might help stave off the disaster of widespread peasant 
unrest in the countryside. The provinces of Kharkov and Poltava, particulariy 
experienced serious peasant disturbances in 1902. 
Matters were taken further in 1903 when a zemstvo programme for agrarian 
reform put before the commission investigating the impoverishment of the 
centre, included the demand that resettlement and population redistribution 
be properiy established on a wide basis. The upheavals of 1905, however, 
sparked a resurgence of negative attitudes towards resettlement. Most 
zemstvos reverted to ignoring the issue although some continued to consider 
the movement and their response to it. Among the latter were the provincial 
zemstva of Perm, Samara, Smolensk, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov and 
Chernigov, together with some district zemstva. (27) 
Zemstvo involvement in resettlement was also evident in areas other than 
debate. A link, however tenuous, was established with the practical aspects 
of resettlement when zemstvo statistician Shcherbin, working with the 
Resettlement Administration, led an expeditionary group in 1895 to research 
Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Turgai oblasts. (28) The first zemstvo-
sponsored expedition was undertaken by Poltava zemstvo which, in 1906, 
despatched their agronomist Sokolovskii, in the company of a party of scouts, 
to Turgai. The object was to assess the suitability of the steppe regions of 
Turgai for settlement by migrants from Poltava province and to study the 
mechanics of resettling migrants. (29) Later in 1906, Sosnitskii uezd in 
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Chernigov province similarly despatched a zemstvo member, N.L. 
Radchenko, to accompany a party of scouts to the Ural region. (30) Further 
trips were undertaken in the following years, notably that by A.A. Svechin, a 
member of Chemigov provincial zemstvo, in 1910. Svechin made detailed 
studies of areas in Turgai and Akmolinsk and assessed conditions for 
migrants, particularly for those from his home province. An account of 
Svechin's trip to Siberia, Otchet o komandirovke v Sibir A. A. Svechina by A. 
Orlov, 1911, reaches several conclusions on ways in which conditions of 
resettlement might be improved. The establishment of permanent offices 
(agentura) in settlement areas is recommended to assist migrants and the 
building of road and rail links is seen as a priority. Insofar as was possible, 
migrants should make the final decision on their choice of plot as this would 
reconcile them to any shortcomings. Surveying needed to be improved and 
agricultural advisers on hand to assist the new settlers, improving their 
farming methods and where possible, reducing the introduction of the 
inefficient practices prevalent in European Russia. The working members of 
a family should be allowed to leave ahead of dependants and thereby be 
given the opportunity to establish themselves more successfully. Credit 
facilities should be available from locally-based agencies. Mobile medical 
teams should be formed. (31) 
The zemstvos were also active in providing food aid for destitute and starving 
migrants. In May 1907, approval was obtained from the Resettlement 
Administration for the provision of food aid to migrants through the All-
Zemstvo Organisation. (32) The Organisation had been established 
originally to assist the sick and wounded during the Russo-Japanese War. It 
later continued its work on a much larger scale during the First World War. 
(33). Meanwhile, it was able to direct its services towards alleviating the 
hardships of the migrants. The effects of the poor harvest of 1906 had been 
particularly severe, with the result that the peasants left their homes already 
short of food, their situation becoming progressively worse as they made their 
way to the settlement areas. 
The very large numbers of out-migrants following the introduction of the 
Stolypin refonns in 1906, elicited further consideration of resettlement 
amongst some individual zemstvos. Ekaterinoslav provincial zemstvo. 
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Kharkov provincial zemstvo and one individual district zemstvo from Kursk 
province and one from Voronezh province turned to Poltava for information 
and advice on migration and resettlement. By 1907 Poltava provincial 
zemstvo had already deployed seven resettlement agents in Siberia, whose 
duties were wholly concerned with the resettlement of migrants at their place 
of destination. It also allocated approximately 14,000 roubles per annum to 
resettlement. (34) 
It is clear however, that there was no sudden surge of concern throughout the 
34 provincial zemstvos and the 358 district zemstvos in existence at the time 
and that the numbers who were anxious to take some sort of positive action 
to promote improved conditions of mass resettlement were very small indeed. 
Calls had been made in the press for increased zemstvo participation in the 
resettlement movement. A.A. Belevskii, in an article published in 1904, went 
so far as to suggest that were zemstvo institutions to be set up in Siberia the 
future management of resettlement and colonisation might safely be left to 
them. In addition to looking after migrants, the zemstvos might also assume 
the tasks of exploration and designation of land suitable for settlement, to all 
intents and purposes making the Resettlement Administration redundant. It 
was argued that the zemstvos, liaising and co-ordinating their activities, 
would be far more effective in reducing the prevailing haphazard nature of 
resettlement and consequent high numbers of settlers who failed to establish 
themselves in their new environment. The rationale behind this desire to see 
increased zemstvo involvement was that no other institution or agency 
possessed greater knowledge of conditions at a local level, or was better 
placed to allocate resources effectively. (35) 
Representatives from several zemstvos met together for three days, 3rd-6th 
October 1907, in Kharkov, at what became known as the first Regional 
Resettlement Conference (Pervyi oblastnoi pereselencheskii s'ezd ). The 
meeting was chaired by the president of the Kharkov provincial zemstvo 
board, Prince A.D. Golitsyn. Other participants included the chairman of 
Poltava and Ekaterinoslav provincial zemstvos, representatives from the 
provincial zemstvos of Chernigov, Kherson, Orel, Poltava and Kharkov, the 
chairmen of three district zemstvos, members of several land settlement 
commissions, several agronomists, a forester, a researcher at an agricultural 
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school, a local director of the Peasant Bank and two of Poltava provincial 
zemstvo's resettlement agents. It is tempting thus far to dismiss the meeting 
as a purely localised affair, but weight is given to its significance by the 
presence of three officials from the Resettlement Administration, one of whom 
was G.V. Glinka (editor of Aziatskaya Rossiya which was to be for some time 
the definitive work on the development and colonisation of Siberia)and two 
members of the All-Zemstvo Organisation, including its President, Prince 
G.E. Lvov. (36) 
The meeting agreed that the zemstvos had a valuable contribution to make to 
the work of resettlement. In the first instance they might usefully assume 
responsibility for all aspects of dealing with migrants prior to their departure. 
This might include issuing permits, organising groups of scouts to be 
accompanied by zemstvo agents, facilitating the sale and purchase of 
migrants' plots, possibly even petitioning central government to grant the 
zemstvos the right to purchase the plots of those who were leaving in order to 
assist the speedy realisation of assets and be in a position to sell the 
acquired plots to those most in need who remained. (37) These were rather 
ambitious proposals and unlikely to have any hope of realisation particularly 
as responsibility for the issuing of permits to migrate, the organising of rail 
transport and scouting parties and, more importantly, land purchase, already 
lay within the government-established land-settlement commissions set up 
the previous year in March 1906 (see Chapter 2). The suggestion that these 
tasks should lie within the scope of zemstvos activity, was clearly an attempt 
by the zemstvo to assume greater powers for themselves by demonstrating 
that the land-settlement commissions were largely unnecessary. It was 
unlikely, however, that government would have handed over responsibility for 
such a key aspect of its agricultural reform and colonisation policy, to 
organisations which it had long mistrusted and over whose activities it might 
have had inadequate control. 
A second important role for the zemstvos was seen to lie in liaising and co-
ordinating their activities with those of the Resettlement Administration in 
settling migrants at their destination. Migrant plots designated by the 
Resettlement Administration should be open to preliminary inspection and 
conditional acceptance, for a set period, by zemstvo officials. At the same 
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time, the zemstvo officials would be required to make detailed plans and 
descriptions of those plots to distribute amongst those wishing to migrate. 
The meeting further agreed that increased subsidies from the central 
government would be needed to provide food and medical aid and for loans, 
sufficient to build a first house, improved rail-links, more river-routes and 
roads, irrigation systems, educational and cultural amenities, experimental 
agricultural stations. (37) 
Finally the meeting accepted proposals for the formation of a regional 
zemstvo resettlement organisation and outlined its structure. The 
organisation would be run by a congress comprising two representatives 
chosen from amongst the members of the provincial zemstvo assemblies of 
each participating province. The congress would meet three times a year in 
February, June and October, before the start, at the height and at the end of 
the migration season. It would formulate the organisation's resettlement 
policy. The executive function of the organisation would lie with a special 
bureau attached to the Poltava provincial zemstvo board and subordinate to 
its control. In addition, an office would be set up within each province to 
operate simultaneously and in conjunction with the central organisation. To 
fund the organisation, each participating zemstvo would contribute annually 
an amount proportional to the number of out-migrants from its province during 
the period 1885-1906 inclusive. (38) 
The new organisation would deploy agents in the settlement areas to act as 
intermediaries between migrants and officials of the Resettlement 
Administration and to generally concern themselves with all aspects of 
distribution and settling of migrants. A resettlement campaign plan would be 
drawn up by the regional organisation and provincial zemstvo boards. There 
would be more liaison between the provincial and district zemstvos on 
matters of resettlement. The district zemstvos should become responsible for 
offering practical assistance in arranging the peasant's departure, completing 
legal formalities for permission to resettle, organising rail transport. The All-
Zemstvo Organisation should continue its work of providing assistance to 
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migrants en route, but where this was not possible, the regional organisation 
would assume responsibilities. (39) 
The proposed Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation also saw for itself a useful 
role in disseminating throughout its member provinces information on the 
resettlement areas in Siberia collated by the Resettlement Administration. 
One of the major defects of the system of resettling migrants as perceived by 
the zemstvos was the paucity of information available to the migrant. It was 
now proposed that zemstvo representatives based in the settlement area 
would obtain information from the Resettlement Administration on the 
progress of settlement, conditions in and geographical details of specific 
areas, the amount and location of land designated for settlement. The 
information would be passed to the new organisation's central bureau for 
onward distribution to member provinces. (40) Sklyarov estimates that in 
1907 more than six-and-a-half million copies of various brochures and 
leaflets were distributed amongst the peasantry, including 130,000 reference 
booklets and 400,000 pamphlets detailing conditions of settlement. He is 
scathing on the subject of those information booklets, asserting that they 
were little more than propaganda and contained glowing, but often, 
misleading information, which encouraged many to depart eastwards without 
the necessary permits and therefore government assistance. On the other 
hand he also acknowledged that the good and bad aspects of particular 
localities were included in those information sheets provided by the 
zemstvos. (41) 
In effect, the work of an organisation which may have been envisaged, 
initially and optimistically, as a potentially influential, regional organisation, 
assuming ever greater responsibility for all aspects of peasant resettlement at 
the expense of the centrally based Resettlement Administration, found its 
aspirations curtailed and its activity limited to looking after the welfare of 
migrants, providing food and medical aid, geographical information and 
ensuring that any difficulties associated with leaving their place of origin and 
settling in at their destination were more speedily overcome. 
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At a meeting held on 8th-11th June 1908 in Poltava, a charter for the 
proposed Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation was finally presented and 
accepted and the South-Russian Regional Zemstvo Resettlement 
Organisation (Yuzhno-russkaya oblastnaya zemskaya pereselencheskaya 
organizatsiya) came into being. The first chairman was F.A. Lizogub, 
chairman of the Poltava provincial zemstvo. The founding members of the 
new organisation were the provinces of Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, Poltava, Kharkov 
and Cheringov. (42) Kiev did not have a zemstvo institution until 1911. 
Instead, it was one of the nine Western provinces in which, in 1903, were 
established non-elected bodies similar to the zemstvo, whose officials were 
appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. (43) Kiev's participation at this early 
stage in the organisation's existence, may suggest a role as counter-balance 
to the more ambitious zemstvo plans, but also indicates that central 
government was not wholly averse to the idea of the zemstvo collaboration in 
the practical and welfare side of resettlement. Map III shows the provinces 
associated with the organisation covered an extensive area within 
agriculturally rich zones. 
A glance at the staffing levels of the new organisation gives an idea of the 
scale of possible activities open to it. The executive ami, which carried out 
the decisions of the congress consisted of a director, a secretary, a copyist, a 
filing clerk and nine settlement agents, two mobile agents to accompany 
migrants en route and seven to be based within the settlement areas in 
Siberia. All of these were transferred from Poltava provincial zemstvo. (44) 
In other words, the executive arm of the organisation was to be those officials 
already deployed in the settlement areas by Poltava provincial zemstvo 
acting alone with the addition of a manager, the first being an agronomist 
M.A. Nikolskii, and office staff, but now the office had greatly increased 
responsibilities. There is heavy reliance on Zenchenko's account in this and 
subsequent paragraphs dealing with areas of zemstvo involvement in 
resettlement, and organisational structure for, despite the occasional lapse of 
accuracy with regard to geographical detail noted by his reviewer (see 
Voprosy kolonizatsiya No. 12 1913 pp. 434-436) and his obvious pro-Poltava 
zemstvo standpoint, he does indicate clearly those areas in which the 
zemstvo organisation felt it had a role to play. 
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Primarily, the organisation's brief was to oversee all the activities affording 
physical assistance to the migrants, to liaise closely with officials of the 
Resettlement Administration in Siberia, tasks undertaken by the locally-based 
resettlement agents, while that part of the office located in Poltava was to act 
as a link between the provincial zemstvos of member provinces and Siberia. 
(45) The scale of the responsibilities also increased with figures for 1908 
showing a total of 230,976 migrants and scouts, legal and illegal originating 
from the five member provinces and heading for Siberia. In 1907, Poltava 
resettlement officials had only had to deal with 30,725 migrants and scouts, 
legal and illegal. (46) 
The agents' tasks were subsequently defined in a charter approved in April 
1912. Those agents deployed in settlement areas were, firstly, to familiarise 
themselves with their respective areas, studying the geographical and 
economic conditions. This included determining the capacity for colonisation 
of a given area and its suitability for agricultural produce, assessing 
communications links, in short everything which might shed greater light on 
the appropriateness of the area for settlement by out-migrants from member 
provinces. Secondly, the agents were to assist scouts in choosing plots of 
land and in registering claims. This involved meeting arriving scouts at a 
designated point, verifying their documents, stressing the obligations of the 
scout vis-a-vis those on whose behalf he had made the journey, acquainting 
him, with the aid of plans, photographs, diagrams with the characteristics of 
the area, describing the migrant plots available for settlement explaining their 
advantages and disadvantages and finally giving the scout the opportunity to 
personally inspect the plots. If, after examination of the plot the scout wished 
to stake his claim in his own name, the agent would assist in registering the 
scout's name as soon as possible. If, on the other hand, the scout wished to 
stake a conditional claim on behalf of others, the agent would advise him of 
the procedure. The agents were further required to advise the length of time 
it might take a migrant to establish himself, to indicate the size of government 
loans and how to apply for such a loan, the best time of year to set out to the 
new lands, the journey conditions and provisions for transport and baggage. 
Thirdly, the agents were to study the conditions of life of the new settlers, 
where necessary rendering assistance to encourage their continued 
occupation of the lands. Agents based within the home provinces were to 
keep prospective scouts and migrants fully informed of appropriate settlement 
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areas, to monitor the operation of the migrant trains, to mediate between 
migrants and officialdom and lastly to do their own studies of the settlement 
areas. (47) The tasks which the zemstvo organisation may have hoped to 
take over from the land-settlement commissions are given no mention here, 
confirming that these responsibilities remained firmly with the representatives 
of the central government. 
In addition to their duties towards the migrants, agents within the settlement 
areas were also required to survey at least fifty migrant plots a year, or 
between 25,000 and 50,000 desyatinas of land. Some managed to conduct 
surveys on up to 200 plots. The information thus gathered was returned to 
the central office in Poltava where it was collated and distributed in a series 
of leaflets and manuals. By the beginning of 1910, a manual for Scouts and 
Migrants and surveys of Akmolinsk, Yenisei, Irkutsk, Semipalatinsk, 
Semireche settlement areas, complete with maps, and lists of migrant plots 
including descriptive notes and plans, had been published. The organisation 
also published a monthly periodical ' Izvestiya'. (48) 
By mid-1912, the organisation had expanded to a total of 57 employees, of 
whom 17 were based at the central office in Poltava, 24 in groups of two in 
each settlement area and 9 as mobile agents. (49) The organisation itself 
had also undergone some change by 1912. In 1909 Ekaterinoslav provincial 
zemstvo discontinued its association, but Kherson and Voronezh joined, as 
did Volhynia in 1910 and Saratov in 1913. There were fears that Kiev and 
Chernigov might also withdraw, indicating that not all ran as smoothly as 
Zenchenko would have his readers believe, but such a development was 
averted. (50) Changes were also made to the structure of the organisation. 
In 1909 it was decided that a plenary sub-committee should be established, 
subordinate to the main decision-making congress which would be able to 
deal with matters falling outside the routine category, but which did not 
require the sanction of the congress. The sub-committee was to consist of a 
single representative from each zemstvo and the director of the executive 
Bureau. (51) 
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This was the position of the South-Russia Regional Zemstvo Resettlement 
Organisation by 1912 when it was invited to submit a paper detailing its own 
achievements with regard to resettlement and zemstvo involvement in 
general to a zemstvo jubilee held in Moscow to celebrate the founding of the 
zemstvo institutions. (52) Zenchenko, while including an outline of the 
aspects of the organisation's work to be covered in the address, gives no 
account of the final evaluation of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation's 
contribution. 
In 1909 a second regional zemstvo resettlement organisation was founded, 
headed by Orel provincial zemstvo. Other member provinces were 
Smolensk, Tula, Tambov, Ryazan, Kursk and Kaluga. (53) It was less well-
documented and may therefore be assumed to have been less effective in its 
activities than the Poltava based South-Russian Zemstvo Resettlement 
Organisation. 
How valuable to the resettlement process were the activities of the Zemstvo 
Resettlement Organisation ? The reviewer of Zenchenko's book, writing in 
1913, describes the work as timely and the zemstvo experiment in 
resettlement matters as instructive and exemplary to other zemstvos. (54) 
Veselovskii considers the zemstvo contribution within the overall resettlement 
programme to be of little significance, (55) while Glinka praises the Zemstvo 
Resettlement Organisation's activities, as does Pavlovsky. Its role is often 
ignored by Soviet historians. (56) 
The South-Russian Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation was not finally 
established until June 1908, midway through the year of highest out-migration 
from European Russia to Siberia. The number of out-migrants from the 
founding member provinces of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov and 
Ekaterinoslav for 1908 was 201,528. To this number must be added 29,448 
scouts. Looking after the welfare of this large number of people were no 
more than nine resettlement agents, two accompanying migrants on the 
journey and seven based within the settlement areas of Siberia. It is almost 
impossible at this juncture to suggest that the work of the Organisation made 
any beneficial impact at all. 
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The tasks which the organisation set itself may be placed within the two 
categories of social welfare and practical assistance in negotiating the 
administrative formalities of resettlement. Success in the former is not easily 
quantifiable on the basis of figures available here. The provision of food and 
medical aid en route and improved conditions of transport may have had a 
considerable impact on the well-being of the individual migrant, but would not 
necessarily have contributed to the rate of successful settlement. The value 
of the Organisation's contribution may be better assessed in terms of its 
activities in relation to the practical aspects of resettlement, the papenvork, 
facilitating licensed departures with all due subsidies and entitlements, which 
may translate into proportionally fewer instances of migrants leaving without 
the necessary permits, or unlicensed, and an improving rate of successful 
settlement compared with the figures for the rest of European Russia. 
Three sets of figures have been compared for Russia as a whole and for the 
Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation ; firstly, the percentage rates of 
unlicensed out-migrants; secondly, the percentage of out-migrants who 
returned within the same year; thirdly, the number of same year returnees as 
a percentage of the total number of returnees per year. The figures are 
based on the number of out-migrants, scouts and returnees from the member 
provinces of Volhynia, Voronezh, Kiev, Poltava, Kharkov, Kherson and 
Chernigov. Although Volhynia zemstvo did not join the Organisation until 
1910, the numbers from this province were so few that little difference would 
have been made to the final figure in the earlier years. 
Pavlovsky agrees with Grigorovsky's contention that the success of the 
Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation is demonstrated by the consistently 
lower percentage figures of unlicensed out-migrants achieved by the 
Organisation compared with the rest of Russia. (57) Table I shows that for 
the three full years for which figures are available here, 1909, 1910, 1911 
and during which the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation was active, the 
Organisation did indeed achieve a lower percentage rate of unlicensed out-
migrants as compared with the rest of Russia, and for the first two years 
1909 and 1910 had a lower percentage rate of unlicensed scouts. However, 
figures for earlier years, 1906, 1907, 1908 show this to have been the case 
also in those same provinces taken together before the founding of the 
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Organisation. Table III shows that percentage rates for out-migrants who 
returned within the same year do not differ greatly, although 1911 shows a 
higher than expected level of same year returnees for the Organisation. The 
percentage of returnees who were returning within the same year is lower for 
Russia as a whole. This may be interpreted as either a positive or negative 
trend (see Chapter III) but is not significant in terms of the beneficial 
contribution made by the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. 
One further indicator might have been a divergence in the percentage of 
unlicensed returnees with perhaps a higher rate of unlicensed returnees 
returning to provinces associated with the Zemstvo Resettlement 
Organisation showing that more licensed migrants were settling successfully. 
Table IV shows falling percentage rates of unlicensed returnees for all 
provinces of the Organisation, and inversely, rising percentages of licensed 
migrants returning. The figures are therefore inconclusive and of limited 
value in assessing the work of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. 
More interesting, however, are the figures at Table V which show the 
percentage of unlicensed out-migrants from six of the individual provinces 
within the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. The figures suggest that the 
lower than national average percentages of unlicensed out-migrants for the 
Organisation as a whole are due to the activities of three provinces : Kiev, 
Poltava and Chernigov. Poltava and Chernigov show consistently lower rates 
of unlicensed out-migrants than the national average throughout the period 
1896 to 1911, as does Kiev from 1906. Figures for Kharkov are remarkably 
similar to the national average, while those for Voronezh are significantly 
higher. Percentage figures for unlicensed scouts are more variable, (see 
Table III ), but between 1906 and 1911 the rates for Chernigov province are 
considerably lower than the national average and must contribute 
significantly to the overall better showing of the Zemstvo Resettlement 
Organisation as a whole compared to the rest of Russia in this respect. The 
number of out-migrants from individual provinces is only significant in 
demonstrating that those provinces with the highest number of out-migrants 
throughout the period 1896-1911, in this instance, Poltava and Chernigov, 
were also those who took active and early steps to promote resettlement. 
(See Table V or VII). 
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The findings lead to the conclusion that in terms of successful settlement, on 
the basis of the figures available, there seems to have been little advantage 
to being an out-migrant from the provinces of the Zemstvo Resettlement 
Organisation. There is however, some basis for suggesting that out-migrants 
from specific provinces, Poltava, Chernigov and Kiev in particular, may have 
received more encouragement to leave, but this did not hinge on the 
organisational frame-work of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. Rather 
it depended on the continuing activities of these individual provincial 
zemstvo, especially Poltava and Chernigov, in support of the principle of 
resettlement. This conclusion does not detract from the Organisation's 
contribution to the provision of information. 
The activities of the South-Russia Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation were, 
however, attracting the interest of other zemstvos, as evidenced by the 
invitation to address the gathering in Moscow in 1912. It is possible that in 
time the Organisation may have had a significant impact on the progress of 
successful resettlement. It is also probable that the Organisation would not 
have remained satisfied with a purely welfare function. In 1910 it declared its 
intention to establish the Organisation on a legal basis. It also joined in the 
call for the introduction of zemstvo institutions in Siberia, sharing Belevskii's 
vision of the zemstvo superseding all other bodies in matters of local 
government. (58) These matters were never definitively resolved and by 
1915, after a steady annual rise in the number of out-migrants between 1912 
and 1914, the outbreak of war and the massive decline in the number of out-
migrants made the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation's activities largely 
irrelevant. 
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CHAPTER V! 
CONCLUSION 
Peasant migration eastwards had a significant impact on the development of 
Siberia and the Tsarist agrarian policies within European Russia. As a result 
of this initially spontaneous movement of peoples certain areas of Siberia 
were, latterly, swiftly and productively colonised, becoming an inalienable 
part of firstly the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union. By 
stimulating government action, migration speeded up the exploration and 
scientific survey of vast tracts of Siberia. Furthermore, migration by the 
peasantry forced the Imperial government to reassess its attitude towards 
agriculture and the role of the peasant within the framework of the State, 
ultimately bringing about a radical overhaul in the organisation of agriculture 
and creating the climate for a restructuring of peasant society. 
Attempts by the Imperial government in the early nineteenth century to 
introduce colonisers into Siberia were singularly unsuccessful. Numbers of 
volunteers recruited were too few and the government half-hearted, unclear 
in its own mind what policies it wanted to pursue. Population density, 
although evident, had not yet reached the proportions it was later to assume 
and nearly half the peasant population, as proprietary serfs, were ineligible to 
volunteer for resettlement. Despite the desire to colonise Siberia and the 
efforts of the Ministry of State Domains, the number of peasants relocated in 
Siberia was not encouraging. Nevertheless, Kiselev's policies had 
established the principle of resettlement. 
The lot of the former serfs was little improved as a result of the Emancipation. 
While freeing him from ownership by the landlord, it tied him to the land and 
to the commune during the period of redemption payment. State peasants 
later became similariy disadvantaged with what little freedom of movement 
they had enjoyed eariier being likewise curtailed. A certain amount of 
movement did however take place as the struggle to make ends meet forced 
many peasants to make their way to other areas in search of wage-work. The 
tales these brought home, while often fuelling rumours, also brought 
knowledge of other areas. Over time, these distant regions became more 
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familiar and less daunting to a prospective migrant. As difficulties associated 
with bad harvests and the population increase arose, numbers of out-
migrants grew. 
Likewise the Act brought little benefit to agriculture. The regular occurence of 
bad harvests and resulting famines continued, culminating in the very severe 
famine of 1891. The inability, unwillingness or simply the sheer enormity of 
the task to introduce beneficial long-term reform into the countryside, meant 
that, of necessity the government viewed the problems of rural Russia from 
the same perspective as the peasant and also concluded that the answer lay 
in increasing the amount of land held by the peasantry. In effect, providing 
more land was the easiest, most practical and immediately visible means of 
addressing the problems of rural deprivation. The disaster of the 1891 
famine and the burgeoning rural population prompted greater activity towards 
this objective, in European Russia, through the Peasant Land Bank and in 
Siberia through the activities of the Trans-Siberian Railway Committee. 
Government intention was always to remain in control of Siberia's 
colonisation. The opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1893, with its 
declared aspirations of populating Siberia with Russians was an expression 
of this intent. Not only did it provide the instrument whereby, ultimately, four 
million migrants made their way to Siberia, but it also encouraged the 
quickening pace of scientific exploration. Much data was collected on 
climate, flora and fauna and soil conditions. Surveying, communications and 
community infrastructures were developed and extended, work later 
continued by the Resettlement Administration. In European Russia the 
emphasis of government policy remained on controlling the out-flow of 
migrants. The apparent contradiction between on the one hand the impetus 
within the peasant population to occupy the uncrowded lands to the east and 
the ambition of the government to bring Siberia under Imperial Russian 
control while at the same time maintaining restraints on the movement of the 
peasantry, is attributable to several factors. Firstly, there was pressure from 
the landlords within European Russia not to risk the possibility of 
destabilising the countryside by allowing unrestrained movement of the mral 
workforce out of Russia. Secondly, the government wished to dictate the 
areas of settlement and direct land allocation, subject to the completion of 
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survey work, in order to give maximum benefit to the State in terms of Slav 
dominance of the land, productive exploitation of natural resources and 
successful settlement. Thirdly, and following on from the last point, there was 
a lack of preparation within Siberia to receive thousands of migrants. It was 
difficult to shed the paternalistic approach and allow each to make his own 
way, although some interest was expressed in the American experience of 
westward expansion by ' homesteaders' . However, the State, again, was 
anxious to avoid creating a large, unstable and itinerant peasant population. 
Fourthly, the negativity with which the peasant was regarded coloured the 
attitude of legislators. There was always doubt as to the peasant's reliability. 
His perceived lack of commitment and tendency to wander required 
continuing checks on his freedom of movement. Despite these misgivings 
and following the hardships endured by the rural population in the early 
1890s, government attitude was changing rapidly. The body of legislation 
concerning migrants enacted in 1896 eased the bureaucratic restraints on 
peasant mobility and introduced widely publicised benefits, including rail-
travel, to migrants who used the proper channels and sought legal 
authorisation to leave their places of origin. Peasant resettlement was 
henceforth to be supported to a degree. It was not a great leap from this 
position to that of 1905 which saw the introduction of the first of Stolypin's 
reforms and heralded the beginning of almost feverish encouragement of out-
migrants from European Russia. 
The causes to the great surge eastwards which began in 1906 can be found 
in the widespread and often violent unrest in the countryside of European 
Russia and Japanese aggression in the Far East. Attempts to restore order 
internally were taken on two fronts, by force and by hastening the pace of 
rural change through the introduction of Stolypin's land reforms. As a result 
of these, the peasant was freer than he had ever been to move out of his 
village if he so wished. The Russo-Japanese War highlighted the 
vulnerability of Siberia to predatory designs by its neighbours, demonstrating 
the necessity for rapid colonisation. Permits to resettle were issued more 
readily than ever before and government expenditure on resettlement rose 
dramatically. 1907 showed the lowest percentage number of unlicensed out-
migrants making their way to Siberia despite an enormous rise in actual 
numbers. Scouts were particularly encouraged. 
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Migration, as distinct from the government's policy of resettlement, pre-
Emancipation and up until the mid-1880s was southwards towards the 
territories of New Russia and eastwards as far as Samara and Orenburg. 
When here too the pool of land ran short, settlers spread further east into 
Siberia. Here, the areas most affected by peasant settlement were the 
provinces of Tomsk and Yeniseisk in Western Siberia, although Tobolsk and 
Transbaikal also received significant numbers of settlers. Increasingly 
though the peasant was being attracted to the steppe regions of 
Semipalatinsk, Turgai and particularly Akmolinsk rather than to the Far East. 
There is little evidence up to the year 1911 to auggest that the role the South-
Russian Regional Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation envisaged for itself 
and attempted to play significantly affected the resettlement process in areas 
which might be deemed to be important, or that it contributed noticeably to 
successful resettlement, although two individual zemstvos within the 
Organisation were more effective than others . Over time the less successful 
zemstvos may have benefited from their association with these. 
The success or failure of the government's resettlement policy is usually 
assessed by Soviet historians on the basis of the number of returnees from 
Siberia. These were many despite bureaucratic attempts to restrict their 
numbers. In all for the period 1896 to 1911 returnees comprised 13.7% of 
the number of out-migrants, with numbers especially heavy in 1909, 1910 and 
1911. Many found their land plots unsuitable for cultivation and had few, if 
any, resources with which to join old settler communes or rent land. By the 
second decade of this century, amongst the returnees were rising numbers of 
longer term settlers returning to European Russia unable to eke out a living in 
Siberia and possibly attracted by rumours of increasing amounts of land to be 
released to the peasantry and by the impact of the Stolypin landholding 
consolidation reforms. Many may have been discouraged from remaining in 
Siberia by the surge in numbers of new settlers from 1907 or they may have 
been among those who sought resettlement, encouraged by Stolypin's lifting 
of restrictions on peasant mobility, and whose numbers were far in excess of 
those the resettlement authorities in Siberia could reasonably manage to 
settle. 
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However, figures from research conducted in 1911 showed that those 
migrants who did settle successfully were slowly increasing in prosperity. 
Numbers of livestock per household were rising in ratio to the length of time 
the household had been settled. Also encouraging were the figures which 
showed that, over time, not only was acreage under cultivation per household 
rising, but the average amount of land occupied by a single household was 
also growing. The peasant settler over the years was not only increasing his 
plot size, but also his productivity. These were the successes of resettlement 
although they perhaps owe as much to peasant initiative as they do to the 
government's resettlement policy. 
What might have happened to Siberia's further development had world war, 
revolution and accession of the Bolsheviks not intervened can only be 
speculation, but, since the rate of exodus from European Russia declined 
after 1910 and greater numbers of long-term settlers were returning and the 
onus on whether to migrate or not continued to remain with the peasant, it 
seems likely that Siberia's colonisation and consequent development would 
have proceeded at a slower pace than that instituted by Lenin and his push 
for industrialisation. During the Tsarist period it was the peasant who 
dictated the pace at which Siberia was colonised and to some extent the 
areas which were surveyed and made ready for settlement. Similarly, the 
activities and development of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation were 
cut short. Under different circumstances, the second regional organisation 
may have established itself and with two organisations catering to the welfare 
and practical aspects of resettlement, the conditions out-migrants had to 
endure, may have been greatly improved. However, war in 1914, reduction in 
the number of out-migrants to a trickle by 1916 and finally revolution in 1917 
brought peasant migration and Tsarist resettlement policy to an abrupt end. 
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